Broadcom has released emergency security updates addressing CVE-2026-123890, a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in VMware vCenter Server that was exploited as a zero-day by a suspected China-nexus cyberespionage actor. The flaw resides in the VMware Directory Service and carries a CVSS 3.1 score of 9.8, Critical.
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant attributed observed exploitation to ARMORY CASTLE, formerly tracked as UNC5221 and also known as Warp Panda. Forensic evidence indicates that the group exploited the vulnerability in early September 2026, more than two months before Broadcom publicly disclosed and patched it on November 19.
The attackers used a custom Golang exploitation utility named BONESAW to target VMware vCenter. Successful exploitation enabled the threat actor to establish an authenticated session as administrator@vsphere.local, extract the vCenter Lightning Memory-Mapped Database (LMDB), obtain SAML signing material, create rogue SSO administrator accounts, and execute commands on the affected appliance.
The vulnerability is particularly dangerous because vCenter functions as the centralized control plane for VMware virtual infrastructure. Compromise can provide attackers with privileged access not only to the management appliance but potentially to managed ESXi hosts and virtual machines. In the observed intrusion, ARMORY CASTLE eventually accessed an ESXi host and extracted files from a Windows guest VM.
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Detect CVE-2026-123890 by monitoring access to vCenter management services, especially TCP port 2012, alongside suspicious SSO account creation, unexpected administrative sessions, unusual use of the VAMI API, changes to SSH settings, and abnormal file or database access originating from vCenter.
CVE-2026-123890 analysis
CVE-2026-123890 affects VMware vCenter Server and related VMware Cloud Foundation, vSphere Foundation, and Telco Cloud environments. Broadcom classifies the issue as an authentication bypass in the VMware Directory Service and assigns it the maximum Critical rating of 9.8 under CVSS 3.1.
Mandiant’s technical analysis provides considerably more detail about the underlying weakness. The vulnerability is an unauthenticated Secure Remote Password (SRP-6a) session-key disclosure issue reachable through Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Calls (DCE/RPC) handled by the vCenter Directory Service, or vmdird.
The relevant interface is exposed over TCP port 2012, which vCenter uses as a control interface for Single Sign-On functionality. ARMORY CASTLE specifically scanned internal environments for VMware-related services on ports including 443, 2012, 5480, and 9080 before exploiting vCenter.
The flaw involves VMware’s rpc_srp_verifier service. According to GTIG, weaknesses in cryptographic logic and authorization can expose a shared SRP session key. An attacker can then use this information to establish an authenticated session as:
administrator@vsphere.local
No valid administrator password is required.
Once the authenticated session is established, the attacker can interact with privileged VMware Directory Service interfaces. Mandiant states that an attacker can execute arbitrary commands and acquire files, including the underlying data.mdb database through the vmdirdbcp RPC interface.
BONESAW significantly automated these capabilities. Mandiant observed the tool being used to:
- create a new SSO administrator account;
- remotely retrieve and parse the vCenter LMDB;
- extract the VMware Security Token Service private SAML signing key;
- create a backdoor machine account through vmdir;
- forge administrative SAML 2.0 assertions;
- assign Global Administrator privileges through the vSphere SOAP API.
This enables attackers to move beyond an initial authentication bypass toward persistent control of the virtualization management layer.
The flaw is distinct from CVE-2026-59309, another vCenter authentication bypass disclosed in July 2026. Both issues can ultimately expose a shared session key without knowledge of the user’s password, but they target different interfaces. CVE-2026-59309 involves malformed authorization tokens sent to vmdir over LDAP, while the newer vulnerability abuses the DCE/RPC SRP authentication path.
This distinction matters operationally. Mandiant observed BONESAW being executed against a vCenter instance that had already been patched for CVE-2026-59309, demonstrating that fixing the earlier vulnerability does not protect against the newly disclosed weakness.
The observed compromise began through a separate zero-day. ARMORY CASTLE initially exploited CVE-2026-102764 in BeyondTrust Remote Support, then moved laterally to internal Linux appliances that lacked EDR coverage. From those hosts, the attackers performed VMware-focused reconnaissance before deploying BONESAW against vCenter.
The group used several additional custom malware families during the intrusion, including the SLIMSAVAGE and CAGEMATCH webshells, BEARBONES backdoor, SAWSNAKE SAML utility, and LAZYBONES backdoor. This tooling illustrates the broader post-exploitation ecosystem surrounding the zero-day rather than representing prerequisites for exploitation itself.
After compromising vCenter, ARMORY CASTLE used another utility, SAWSNAKE, capable of extracting identity provider signing keys and supporting Golden SAML-style attacks. Forged SAML authentication tokens can allow an attacker to impersonate users and potentially bypass MFA controls.
The attackers also enabled SSH on the vCenter appliance through its management API, stole the vCenter master symmetric encryption key and PostgreSQL database credentials, and then disabled SSH again. This highlights why defenders must inspect historical configuration changes rather than checking only the appliance’s current state.
The group ultimately moved to an ESXi host, added an SSH public key to the root account, and used VMware filesystem tooling to access virtual-disk contents. Mandiant observed extraction of sensitive Windows files from a guest VM, including registry hive material.
A working exploitation tool clearly exists because Mandiant recovered and analyzed BONESAW from real-world attacks. However, GTIG has not released BONESAW, and Censys reported after disclosure that it had not identified publicly available exploit code for this specific vulnerability. Public exploit material for the earlier CVE-2026-59309 should not be confused with an exploit for this new issue.
Mandiant recovered BONESAW with a Go build metadata timestamp of July 13, 2026, which predates public disclosure of CVE-2026-59309 by 16 days. Researchers caution that Go build metadata can be modified, so this timestamp alone does not establish when the vulnerability was discovered. Nevertheless, Mandiant says it has evidence ARMORY CASTLE possessed knowledge of the new flaw before the July disclosure of the earlier vCenter vulnerability.
For CVE-2026-123890 detection, defenders should prioritize network and identity activity related to vCenter’s control plane. Scanning or unusual connections involving TCP port 2012 are particularly relevant when combined with access to ports 443, 389, 5480, or 9080. Mandiant observed ARMORY CASTLE explicitly scanning these VMware-related services before exploitation.
Organizations should also investigate:
- unexpected SSO administrator accounts;
- administrative sessions involving administrator@vsphere.local;
- unexpected access to /storage/db/vmware-vmdir/data.mdb;
- VAMI API activity enabling or disabling SSH;
- new SSH keys added to ESXi root accounts;
- unexpected extraction of STS or identity-provider signing material;
- unusual vCenter-to-ESXi lateral movement;
- unexpected access to virtual disk files.
The published CVE-2026-123890 IOCs associated with the broader ARMORY CASTLE intrusion include the BONESAW filename /tmp/123, SAWSNAKE at /tmp/sss, BEARBONES at /tmp/dbr, and LAZYBONES at /usr/bin/vmtoolscs. GTIG also published several suspected obfuscation-network IP addresses, including 103.147.251[.]5, 103.190.38[.]3, 176.9.89[.]66, and 185.71.15[.]109.
These indicators should support retrospective hunting but should not be treated as complete evidence of exposure. The vulnerability itself can be exploited without those specific files or infrastructure, and future attackers are unlikely to reuse ARMORY CASTLE’s exact tooling.
Security teams seeking additional details for CVE-2026-123890 should distinguish Broadcom’s confirmed vulnerability information from Mandiant’s campaign observations. Broadcom confirms the critical authentication bypass and affected versions, while GTIG/Mandiant provide the evidence for real-world zero-day exploitation, BONESAW capabilities, and ARMORY CASTLE attribution.
CVE-2026-123890 Mitigation
Broadcom states that there is no workaround for this vulnerability. Organizations running affected VMware environments should therefore install the appropriate patched release as soon as possible.
The main fixed versions are:
| Product / Branch | Fixed Version |
| VMware Cloud Foundation / vSphere Foundation vCenter 9.1.x | 9.1.1.0200 |
| VMware Cloud Foundation / vSphere Foundation vCenter 9.0.x | 9.0.2.0200 |
| VMware vCenter Server 8.0 | 8.0 U3m |
| VMware Cloud Foundation 5.x | 5.2.5 |
| VMware vCenter Server 7.0 | Contact Broadcom Support with an extended-support contract |
| VMware Telco Cloud Platform / Infrastructure | Follow Broadcom KB463116 |
Broadcom’s advisory explicitly lists VMware vCenter 7.0 as affected but does not provide a generally available fixed release because the branch has reached end of general support. Customers with extended support should contact Broadcom for remediation guidance.
Because exploitation occurred before public disclosure, organizations should not treat patch installation as the end of incident response. Any vCenter instance that was reachable by potentially compromised internal hosts while vulnerable should be reviewed for signs of previous compromise.
Security teams should examine SSO and directory records for unauthorized accounts, particularly newly created administrators or machine accounts. Accounts that cannot be tied to a legitimate administrative workflow should be treated as suspicious.
Defenders should also review vCenter management telemetry for historical SSH enablement. ARMORY CASTLE enabled SSH through the appliance management API, collected sensitive information, and disabled it again, meaning a currently disabled SSH service does not prove it was never used maliciously.
Check ESXi hosts managed by potentially compromised vCenter instances for unauthorized entries in root authorized_keys, unusual SSH access, unexpected files, or evidence that virtual machine disks were mounted and accessed outside normal administrative workflows.
If vCenter compromise is confirmed or strongly suspected, organizations should consider SAML and cryptographic material exposed. This includes STS signing keys, identity-provider certificates, master encryption keys, database credentials, and privileged VMware credentials.
Where signing keys may have been stolen, simply changing user passwords may be insufficient because an attacker with the private SAML signing key could forge valid authentication assertions. Incident response should therefore include appropriate certificate and signing-key rotation according to VMware guidance.
Network architecture should also be hardened after patching. Mandiant recommends treating the vCenter appliance as a high-value control-plane system and restricting administrative access using Zero Trust principles rather than assuming internal network placement provides adequate protection.
Access to sensitive interfaces such as TCP 2012, VAMI on TCP 5480, SSH on TCP 22, and the vSphere API should be restricted to explicitly authorized management systems. Mandiant notes that the default VCSA firewall provides limited port-level granularity and forensic visibility, so additional network controls may be necessary.
Organizations should also ensure EDR and centralized logging cover Linux-based infrastructure appliances wherever possible. In the documented campaign, ARMORY CASTLE deliberately moved through internal Linux systems lacking endpoint monitoring before attacking vCenter.
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FAQ
What is CVE-2026-123890 and how does it work?
CVE-2026-123890 is a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in VMware vCenter’s Directory Service. The flaw exposes an SRP-6a session key through the vmdird DCE/RPC interface on TCP port 2012. An unauthenticated attacker with network access can use the exposed session information to establish an authenticated session as administrator@vsphere.local, providing highly privileged access to vCenter.
When was CVE-2026-123890 first discovered?
The precise date when the vulnerability was initially discovered is not publicly documented. Mandiant observed ARMORY CASTLE exploiting it in early September 2026, while the recovered BONESAW binary contained a July 13 build timestamp. Researchers caution that this timestamp can be modified and therefore is not definitive evidence of the discovery date. Broadcom publicly disclosed the flaw and released fixes on November 19, 2026.
What is the impact of CVE-2026-123890 on systems?
Successful exploitation provides an authenticated vCenter administrator session without requiring valid credentials. Attackers can execute commands, steal the VMware Directory Service database, obtain SAML signing material, create persistent SSO administrator accounts, and potentially pivot from vCenter to managed ESXi hosts and guest virtual machines. Mandiant describes BONESAW as capable of achieving full compromise of targeted vCenter 7.x and 8.x appliances.
Can CVE-2026-123890 still affect me in 2026?
Yes. Systems remain exposed if they run an affected VMware vCenter release and have not received the November security updates. Broadcom lists affected branches across vCenter 7.0, 8.0, 9.0.x, 9.1.x, VMware Cloud Foundation, and several Telco Cloud deployments. Because the flaw was exploited before disclosure, organizations that have already patched should still review previously exposed systems for evidence of compromise.
How can I protect myself from CVE-2026-123890?
Install the fixed vCenter release specified by Broadcom immediately because no workaround is available. After patching, inspect SSO administrator accounts, VMware Directory Service activity, historical SSH enablement, SAML signing material, ESXi root SSH keys, and suspicious access to virtual machine disks. Organizations should also restrict access to vCenter management interfaces and improve centralized logging and endpoint visibility across virtualization infrastructure.