Caccia a Lazarus: All’interno dell’Infrastruttura di Comando e Controllo dell’Intervista Contagiosa

Ruslan Mikhalov Chief of Threat Research at SOC Prime

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Caccia a Lazarus: All’interno dell’Infrastruttura di Comando e Controllo dell’Intervista Contagiosa

Detection stack

AIDR
Alert
ETL
Query

Rapporto
Flusso di Attacco
Rilevamenti
Simulazioni

Riepilogo

Red Asgard ha riportato un compromesso nella catena di fornitura legato a un progetto di criptovaluta promosso tramite Upwork, in cui gli operatori di Lazarus hanno inserito codice malevolo nel flusso di lavoro/costruzione. La catena sfrutta l’auto-esecuzione dei task di VSCode, una backdoor Node.js implementata tramite il costruttore Function, e la consegna di payload mediante cookie per recuperare JavaScript malevolo dall’infrastruttura di comando e controllo ospitata da Vercel. Lo stack C2 è suddiviso in domini Vercel di primo stadio e server Windows dedicati di secondo stadio, che forniscono una backdoor Python fortemente offuscata con funzionalità di mining XMRig. La campagna utilizza anche dead drop su Pastebin, un protocollo binario personalizzato e una rigida compartimentazione delle credenziali per complicare l’analisi e la rimozione.

Indagine

I ricercatori hanno enumerato tre domini Vercel che espongono endpoint autenticati con token e hanno identificato cinque sistemi C2 dedicati in esecuzione Express.js on porta 1244. Hanno anche documentato una tecnica a tempo di oracle utilizzata per dedurre o enumerare i token della campagna attivi. Il reverse engineering di un payload offuscato a 64 strati ha rivelato infine un componente infettato che persiste tramite la collocazione nella cartella di Avvio e la creazione di compiti pianificati. Ulteriori risultati includevano credenziali MongoDB hard-coded, circa 1000 URL dead drop su Pastebin e listener di protocollo binario Z238 personalizzato su più porte.

Mitigazione

Blocca le comunicazioni in uscita verso i domini Vercel identificati e limita l’uscita alle porte 1244, 1249 e 22411–22412. Monitora la creazione di Windows Update Script.pyw nei percorsi di Avvio, compiti pianificati denominati “Runtime Broker” e esecuzioni sospette di msedge.exe coerenti con la mascheratura del miner. Rileva processi Node.js che invocano Function.constructor e attività HTTP POST anomale verso endpoint /keys. Riduci l’esposizione disabilitando i task di auto-esecuzione di VSCode e rivedi gli script dei pacchetti prima di eseguire npm install o i passaggi di costruzione in repository non attendibili.

Risposta

Se vengono osservati indicatori, isola il sistema interessato, termina i processi sospetti e conserva la memoria e i reperti su disco per la revisione forense. Revoca eventuali credenziali MongoDB esposte e ruota tutti i segreti service-account pertinenti. Effettua un inventario di account e accessi per identificare gli utenti interessati, quindi reimposta le credenziali e invalida le sessioni/token attivi. Notifica ai responsabili interni e coordina con le forze dell’ordine se ci sono prove di furto di criptovalute o compromessi del portafoglio.

“graph TB %% Class definitions classDef technique fill:#cce5ff classDef artifact fill:#e2f7d6 %% Step 1 u2013 Phishing via Service tech_phishing[“Tecnica – T1566.003 Phishing: Spearphishing via Service Descrizione: L’attaccante si è fatto passare per un freelancer su Upwork e ha pubblicato un finto colloquio di lavoro per consegnare un repository di codice maligno.”] class tech_phishing technique artifact_upwork[“Artefatto – Nome: Annuncio di Lavoro Falso su Upwork Scopo: Attirare la vittima a scaricare un repository malevolo.”] class artifact_upwork artifact tech_phishing u002du002d>|consegna| artifact_upwork %% Step 2 u2013 Supply Chain Compromise tech_supplychain[“Tecnica – T1195.001 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromissione delle Dipendenze Software e degli Strumenti di Sviluppo Descrizione: Maligno VSCode <code>tasks.json</code> e codice JavaScript iniettato nel repository.”] class tech_supplychain technique artifact_tasksjson[“Artefatto – Nome: VSCode <code>tasks.json</code> Contenuto: Definizione di attività malevola che invoca il costruttore di funzioni JavaScript e <code>getCookie()</code>.”] class artifact_tasksjson artifact artifact_upwork u002du002d>|contiene| artifact_tasksjson artifact_tasksjson u002du002d>|abilita| tech_supplychain %% Step 3 u2013 User Execution tech_userexec[“Tecnica – T1204.002 User Execution: File Maligno Descrizione: La vittima ha aperto la cartella del progetto in VSCode, attivando l’autoesecuzione dei compiti maligni.”] class tech_userexec technique artifact_tasksjson u002du002d>|innescato da| tech_userexec %% Step 4 u2013 JavaScript Execution tech_jsexec[“Tecnica – T1059.007 Interprete di Comandi e Scripting: JavaScript Descrizione: JavaScript eseguito tramite i compiti di VSCode e costruttore di funzioni per scaricare payload aggiuntivi.”] class tech_jsexec technique tech_userexec u002du002d>|porta a| tech_jsexec %% Step 5 u2013 Python Backdoor tech_python[“Tecnica – T1059.006 Interprete di Comandi e Scripting: Python Descrizione: Backdoor Python pesantemente offuscato (<code>bro_*.js</code>) scaricato ed eseguito sull’host della vittima.”] class tech_python technique artifact_python_backdoor[“Artefatto – Nome: Backdoor Python Offuscato (<code>bro_*.js</code>) Caratteristiche: Codifica e decodifica a più livelli.”] class artifact_python_backdoor artifact tech_jsexec u002du002d>|scarica| artifact_python_backdoor artifact_python_backdoor u002du002d>|esegue| tech_python %% Step 6 u2013 Startup Persistence tech_startup[“Tecnica – T1037.005 Script di Inizializzazione di Boot o Logon: Elementi di Avvio Descrizione: Persistenza attraverso il posizionamento di <code>Windows Update Script.pyw</code> nella cartella di Avvio.”] class tech_startup technique artifact_startup_script[“Artefatto – Nome: <code>Windows Update Script.pyw</code> Posizione: Cartella di avvio”] class artifact_startup_script artifact tech_python u002du002d>|crea| artifact_startup_script artifact_startup_script u002du002d>|abilita| tech_startup %% Step 7 u2013 Scheduled Task tech_schedtask[“Tecnica – T1053 Attività/Processo Pianificato Descrizione: Attività pianificata chiamata u201cRuntime Brokeru201d creata per avviarsi al login.”] class tech_schedtask technique artifact_schedtask[“Artefatto – Nome: Attività Pianificata u201cRuntime Brokeru201d Attivatore: All’accesso dell’utente”] class artifact_schedtask artifact tech_startup u002du002d>|aggiunge| artifact_schedtask artifact_schedtask u002du002d>|esegue| tech_schedtask %% Step 8 u2013 Credential Harvesting from Browsers tech_credbrowser[“Tecnica – T1555.003 Credenziali da Archivi di Password: Credenziali da Browser Web Descrizione: Malware ha raccolto dati di profilo del browser e credenziali memorizzate.”] class tech_credbrowser technique artifact_browser_data[“Artefatto – Dati: Password e cookie estratti dal browser”] class artifact_browser_data artifact tech_schedtask u002du002d>|raccoglie| tech_credbrowser tech_credbrowser u002du002d>|memorizza| artifact_browser_data %% Step 9 u2013 Steal Web Session Cookie tech_stealcookie[“Tecnica – T1539 Rubare il Cookie di Sessione Web Descrizione: La funzione <code>getCookie()</code> ha recuperato i cookie di sessione dal browser della vittima.”] class tech_stealcookie technique artifact_getcookie[“Artefatto – Dati: Cookie di sessione catturati dai browser”] class artifact_getcookie artifact tech_credbrowser u002du002d>|abilita| tech_stealcookie tech_stealcookie u002du002d>|produce| artifact_getcookie %% Step 10 u2013 Use Alternate Authentication Material tech_altauth[“Tecnica – T1550.004 Utilizzare Materiale di Autenticazione Alternativo: Cookie di Sessione Web Descrizione: I cookie raccolti sono stati poi utilizzati per dirottare sessioni web autenticate.”] class tech_altauth technique artifact_getcookie u002du002d>|utilizzato da| tech_altauth %% Step 11 u2013 Masquerading tech_masquerade[“Tecnica – T1036.003 Mascheramento: Rinomina delle Utilità Legittime Descrizione: I binari maligni sono stati rinominati in u201cRuntime Broker.exeu201d e u201cmsedge.exeu201d.”] class tech_masquerade technique artifact_renamed_bins[“Artefatto – File: <code>Runtime Broker.exe</code>, <code>msedge.exe</code> (maligno)”] class artifact_renamed_bins artifact tech_altauth u002du002d>|consegna| artifact_renamed_bins artifact_renamed_bins u002du002d>|utilizzato in| tech_masquerade %% Step 12 u2013 Impair Defenses tech_impairdefense[“Tecnica – T1562 Compromissione delle Difese Descrizione: Aggiunte esclusioni di Windows Defender tramite PowerShell per evitare il rilevamento.”] class tech_impairdefense technique artifact_defender_exclusion[“Artefatto – Comando: Script PowerShell che aggiunge percorsi di esclusione a Defender”] class artifact_defender_exclusion artifact tech_masquerade u002du002d>|esegue| artifact_defender_exclusion artifact_defender_exclusion u002du002d>|abilita| tech_impairdefense %% Step 13 u2013 Obfuscated Files tech_obfuscation[“Tecnica – T1027 File o Informazioni Offuscate Descrizione: Il payload ha utilizzato 64 livelli di offuscamento nidificati (Base85, XOR, zlib, Base64 invertito).”] class tech_obfuscation technique tech_impairdefense u002du002d>|protegge| tech_obfuscation %% Step 14 u2013 Hide Artifacts tech_hideartifacts[“Tecnica – T1564.012 Nascondi Artefatti: Esclusioni di File/Percorso Descrizione: Esclusioni di Defender e file nascosti usati per nascondere artefatti malevoli.”] class tech_hideartifacts technique tech_obfuscation u002du002d>|facilita| tech_hideartifacts %% Step 15 u2013 Deadu2011Drop Resolver tech_dead_drop[“Tecnica – T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver Descrizione: Il malware ha recuperato comandi da una rete di ~1000 account Pastebin come dead-drop.”] class tech_dead_drop technique artifact_pastebin[“Artefatto – Servizio: Account resolver dead-drop su Pastebin”] class artifact_pastebin artifact tech_hideartifacts u002du002d>|recupera| artifact_pastebin artifact_pastebin u002du002d>|fornisce comandi a| tech_dead_drop %% Step 16 u2013 Exfiltration Over FTP tech_exfilftp[“Tecnica – T1048.003 Esfiltrazione Tramite Protocollo Alternativo: Protocollo Non-C2 Non Cifrato Descrizione: Dati raccolti esfiltrati via FTP sulla porta 21.”] class tech_exfilftp technique artifact_ftp[“Artefatto – Protocollo: FTP (porta 21) utilizzato per il trasferimento dati”] class artifact_ftp artifact tech_dead_drop u002du002d>|invia dati tramite| tech_exfilftp tech_exfilftp u002du002d>|utilizza| artifact_ftp %% Step 17 u2013 Resource Hijacking (Monero Mining) tech_resourcehijack[“Tecnica – T1496.001 Appropriazione di Risorse: Appropriazione di Calcolo Descrizione: Monero miner XMRig distribuito, camuffato da u201cmsedge.exeu201d, per monetizzare gli host infetti.”] class tech_resourcehijack technique artifact_xmrig[“Artefatto – File: Binario miner XMRig chiamato <code>msedge.exe</code>”] class artifact_xmrig artifact tech_exfilftp u002du002d>|fornisce risorse per| tech_resourcehijack tech_resourcehijack u002du002d>|esegue| artifact_xmrig %% Step 18 u2013 Browser Information Discovery tech_browserdisc[“Tecnica – T1217 Scoperta di Informazioni del Browser Descrizione: L’attaccante ha enumerato le informazioni del browser per individuare credenziali e dati di sessione aggiuntivi.”] class tech_browserdisc technique artifact_browser_info[“Artefatto – Dati: Versione del browser, percorsi del profilo, estensioni installate”] class artifact_browser_info artifact tech_resourcehijack u002du002d>|raccoglie| tech_browserdisc tech_browserdisc u002du002d>|raccoglie| artifact_browser_info “

Flusso d’Attacco

Visualizza

Esecuzione della Simulazione

Prerequisito: il Telemetry & Baseline Pre‑flight Check deve essere stato superato.

Narrativa dell’Attacco & Comandi

L’avversario copia il legittimo RuntimeBroker.exe binario in una posizione non standard (%TEMP%) per mascherarsi come un processo affidabile evitando il rilevamento basato su percorsi di sistema noti. Eseguendo la copia, l’evento di creazione del processo contiene il nome dell’immagine attesa ma un percorso che non supera il controllo di contenimento ‘System32’, soddisfacendo selection_runtime.

Script di Test di Regressione

# -----------------------------------------------
# TC-20260114-A1B2C – Simulazione di Mascheramento
# -----------------------------------------------

# 1. Definire i percorsi
$src  = "$env:SystemRootSystem32RuntimeBroker.exe"
$dest = "$env:TEMPRuntimeBroker.exe"

# 2. Copiare il binario legittimo in una directory non di sistema
Copy-Item -Path $src -Destination $dest -Force

# 3. Eseguire il binario copiato (questo dovrebbe attivare la regola Sigma)
Start-Process -FilePath $dest -WindowStyle Hidden

# 4. OPZIONALE: Simulare lo scenario di mascheramento msedge (miner)
#    (Copiare un qualsiasi eseguibile benigno, rinominarlo come msedge.exe, collocarlo in %LOCALAPPDATA%MicrosoftWindowsApplications)
$minerSrc  = "$env:SystemRootSystem32notepad.exe"
$minerDest = "$env:LOCALAPPDATAMicrosoftWindowsApplicationsmsedge.exe"
Copy-Item -Path $minerSrc -Destination $minerDest -Force
Start-Process -FilePath $minerDest -WindowStyle Hidden
# -----------------------------------------------

Comandi di Ripulitura

# Rimuovere le copie malevoli
Remove-Item -Path "$env:TEMPRuntimeBroker.exe" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item -Path "$env:LOCALAPPDATAMicrosoftWindowsApplicationsmsedge.exe" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

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Name	Descripiton
PHPSESSID	Preserves user session state across page requests. Cookie generated by applications based on the PHP language. This is a general purpose identifier used to maintain user session variables. It is normally a random generated number, how it is used can be specific to the site, but a good example is maintaining a logged-in status for a user between pages.
sp_i	Used to store information about authenticated User.
sp_r	Used to store information about authenticated User.
sp_a	Used to store information about authenticated User.

Name	Descripiton
tuuid	Collects anonymous data related to the user's visits to the website, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded.
tuuid_last_update	Collects anonymous data related to the user's visits to the website, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded.
um	Collects anonymous data related to the user's visits to the website, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded.
umeh	Collects anonymous data related to the user's visits to the website, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded.
na_sc_x	Used by the social sharing platform AddThis to keep a record of parts of the site that has been visited in order to recommend other parts of the site.
APID	Collects anonymous data related to the user's visits to the website.
IDSYNC	Collects anonymous data related to the user's visits to the website.
_cc_aud	Collects anonymous statistical data related to the user's website visits, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded. The purpose is to segment the website's users according to factors such as demographics and geographical location, in order to enable media and marketing agencies to structure and understand their target groups to enable customised online advertising.
_cc_cc	Collects anonymous statistical data related to the user's website visits, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded. The purpose is to segment the website's users according to factors such as demographics and geographical location, in order to enable media and marketing agencies to structure and understand their target groups to enable customised online advertising.
_cc_dc	Collects anonymous statistical data related to the user's website visits, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded. The purpose is to segment the website's users according to factors such as demographics and geographical location, in order to enable media and marketing agencies to structure and understand their target groups to enable customised online advertising.
_cc_id	Collects anonymous statistical data related to the user's website visits, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded. The purpose is to segment the website's users according to factors such as demographics and geographical location, in order to enable media and marketing agencies to structure and understand their target groups to enable customised online advertising.
dpm	Via a unique ID that is used for semantic content analysis, the user's navigation on the website is registered and linked to offline data from surveys and similar registrations to display targeted ads.
acs	Collects anonymous data related to the user's visits to the website, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded, with the purpose of displaying targeted ads.
clid	Collects anonymous data related to the user's visits to the website, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded, with the purpose of displaying targeted ads.
KRTBCOOKIE_#	Registers a unique ID that identifies the user's device during return visits across websites that use the same ad network. The ID is used to allow targeted ads.
PUBMDCID	Registers a unique ID that identifies the user's device during return visits across websites that use the same ad network. The ID is used to allow targeted ads.
PugT	Registers a unique ID that identifies the user's device during return visits across websites that use the same ad network. The ID is used to allow targeted ads.
ssi	Registers a unique ID that identifies a returning user's device. The ID is used for targeted ads.
_tmid	Registers a unique ID that identifies the user's device upon return visits. The ID is used to target ads in video clips.
wam-sync	Used by the advertising platform Weborama to determine the visitor's interests based on pages visits, content clicked and other actions on the website.
wui	Used by the advertising platform Weborama to determine the visitor's interests based on pages visits, content clicked and other actions on the website.
AFFICHE_W	Used by the advertising platform Weborama to determine the visitor's interests based on pages visits, content clicked and other actions on the website.
B	Collects anonymous data related to the user's website visits, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded. The registered data is used to categorise the users' interest and demographical profiles with the purpose of customising the website content depending on the visitor.
1P_JAR	These cookies are used to gather website statistics, and track conversion rates.
APISID	Google set a number of cookies on any page that includes a Google reCAPTCHA. While we have no control over the cookies set by Google, they appear to include a mixture of pieces of information to measure the number and behaviour of Google reCAPTCHA users.
HSID	Google set a number of cookies on any page that includes a Google reCAPTCHA. While we have no control over the cookies set by Google, they appear to include a mixture of pieces of information to measure the number and behaviour of Google reCAPTCHA users.
NID	Google set a number of cookies on any page that includes a Google reCAPTCHA. While we have no control over the cookies set by Google, they appear to include a mixture of pieces of information to measure the number and behaviour of Google reCAPTCHA users.
SAPISID	Google set a number of cookies on any page that includes a Google reCAPTCHA. While we have no control over the cookies set by Google, they appear to include a mixture of pieces of information to measure the number and behaviour of Google reCAPTCHA users.
SID	Google set a number of cookies on any page that includes a Google reCAPTCHA. While we have no control over the cookies set by Google, they appear to include a mixture of pieces of information to measure the number and behaviour of Google reCAPTCHA users.
SIDCC	Security cookie to protect users data from unauthorised access.
SSID	Google set a number of cookies on any page that includes a Google reCAPTCHA. While we have no control over the cookies set by Google, they appear to include a mixture of pieces of information to measure the number and behaviour of Google reCAPTCHA users.
__utmx	This cookie is associated with Google Website Optimizer, a tool designed to help site owners improve their wbesites. It is used to distinguish between two varaitions a webpage that might be shown to a visitor as part of an A/B split test. This helps site owners to detemine which version of a page performs better, and therefore helps to improve the website.
__utmxx	This cookie is associated with Google Website Optimizer, a tool designed to help site owners improve their wbesites. It is used to distinguish between two varaitions a webpage that might be shown to a visitor as part of an A/B split test. This helps site owners to detemine which version of a page performs better, and therefore helps to improve the website.

Name	Descripiton
_hjid	Hotjar cookie. This cookie is set when the customer first lands on a page with the Hotjar script. It is used to persist the random user ID, unique to that site on the browser. This ensures that behavior in subsequent visits to the same site will be attributed to the same user ID.
_hjIncludedInSample	This cookie is associated with web analytics functionality and services from Hot Jar, a Malta based company. It uniquely identifies a visitor during a single browser session and indicates they are included in an audience sample.
intercom-id-[xxx]	This cookie is used by Intercom as a session so that users can continue a chat as they move through the site.
intercom-session-[xxx]	Used to keeping track of sessions and remember logins and conversations.
demdex	Via a unique ID that is used for semantic content analysis, the user's navigation on the website is registered and linked to offline data from surveys and similar registrations to display targeted ads.
CookieConsent	Stores the user's cookie consent state for the current domain.
__cfduid	Used by the content network, Cloudflare, to identify trusted web traffic.
ss	These cookies enable the website to provide enhanced functionality and personalisation . They may be set by us or by third party providers whose services we have added to our pages. These services may include the Live Chat facility, Contact Us form(s), the Product Quotation forms and submission process, and the Email Newsletter sign up functionality .

Name	Descripiton
_ga	This cookie name is asssociated with Google Universal Analytics - which is a significant update to Google's more commonly used analytics service. This cookie is used to distinguish unique users by assigning a randomly generated number as a client identifier. It is included in each page. Registers a unique ID that is used to generate statistical data on how the visitor uses the website. request in a site and used to calculate visitor, session and campaign data for the sites analytics reports. By default it is set to expire after 2 years, although this is customisable by website owners.
_gat	Used by Google Analytics to throttle request rate. This cookie name is associated with Google Universal Analytics, according to documentation it is used to throttle the request rate - limiting the collection of data on high traffic sites. It expires after 10 minutes.
_gid	This cookie name is asssociated with Google Universal Analytics. This appears to be a new cookie and as of Spring 2017 no information is available from Google. It appears to store and update a unique value for each page visited. Registers a unique ID that is used to generate statistical data on how the visitor uses the website.
IDE	Used by Google DoubleClick to register and report the website user's actions after viewing or clicking one of the advertiser's ads with the purpose of measuring the efficacy of an ad and to present targeted ads to the user.
r/collect	Used by Google DoubleClick to register and report the website user's actions after viewing or clicking one of the advertiser's ads with the purpose of measuring the efficacy of an ad and to present targeted ads to the user.
test_cookie	Used to check if the user's browser supports cookies.
collect	Used to send data to Google Analytics about the visitor's device and behaviour. Tracks the visitor across devices and marketing channels.
ads/user-lists/#	These cookies may be set through our site by our advertising partners. They may be used by those companies to build a profile of your interests and show you relevant adverts on other sites.
c	Registers anonymised user data, such as IP address, geographical location, visited websites, and what ads the user has clicked, with the purpose of optimising ad display based on the user's movement on websites that use the same ad network.
khaos	Registers anonymised user data, such as IP address, geographical location, visited websites, and what ads the user has clicked, with the purpose of optimising ad display based on the user's movement on websites that use the same ad network.
put_#	Registers anonymised user data, such as IP address, geographical location, visited websites, and what ads the user has clicked, with the purpose of optimising ad display based on the user's movement on websites that use the same ad network.
rpb	Registers anonymised user data, such as IP address, geographical location, visited websites, and what ads the user has clicked, with the purpose of optimising ad display based on the user's movement on websites that use the same ad network.
rpx	Registers anonymised user data, such as IP address, geographical location, visited websites, and what ads the user has clicked, with the purpose of optimising ad display based on the user's movement on websites that use the same ad network.
tap.php	Registers anonymised user data, such as IP address, geographical location, visited websites, and what ads the user has clicked, with the purpose of optimising ad display based on the user's movement on websites that use the same ad network.