Jagd auf Lazarus: Einblick in die ansteckende Interview-C2-Infrastruktur

Ruslan Mikhalov Chief of Threat Research at SOC Prime

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Jagd auf Lazarus: Einblick in die ansteckende Interview-C2-Infrastruktur

Detection stack

AIDR
Alert
ETL
Query

Bedrohungsbericht
Angriffsablauf
Erkennungen
Simulationen

Zusammenfassung

Red Asgard berichtete über eine Kompromittierung der Lieferkette im Zusammenhang mit einem Kryptowährungsprojekt, das über Upwork beworben wurde, bei dem Lazarus-Betreiber bösartigen Code in den Build/Workflow eingebettet haben. Die Kette missbraucht die Autoausführung von VSCode-Aufgaben, eine Node.js-Hintertür, die durch den Function-Konstruktor implementiert wurde, und die durch Cookies gesteuerte Bereitstellung von Nutzlasten, um bösartiges JavaScript von einer Vercel-gehosteten Command-and-Control-Infrastruktur abzurufen. Der C2-Stack ist in Vercel-Domains der ersten Stufe und dedizierte Windows-Server der zweiten Stufe aufgeteilt, die eine stark verschleierte Python-Hintertür mit XMRig-Mining-Funktionalität liefern. Die Kampagne verwendet auch Pastebin-Totbriefe, ein benutzerdefiniertes Binärprotokoll und eine strikte Trennung von Zugangsdaten, um die Analyse und Beseitigung zu erschweren.

Untersuchung

Die Forscher zählten drei Vercel-Domains auf, die Token-authentifizierte Endpunkte bereitstellen, und identifizierten fünf dedizierte C2-Systeme, die Express.js on Port 1244ausführen. Sie dokumentierten auch eine Timing-Oracle-Technik, die verwendet wurde, um aktive Kampagnen-Token zu ermitteln oder aufzulisten. Das Reverse Engineering einer 64-schichtigen verschleierten Nutzlast offenbarte letztendlich eine trojanisierte Komponente, die durch die Platzierung im Autostart-Ordner und die Erstellung geplanter Aufgaben persistiert. Weitere Funde umfassten hartcodierte MongoDB-Anmeldeinformationen, etwa 1.000 Pastebin-Totbriefe-URLs und benutzerdefinierte Z238-Binärprotokoll-Listener auf mehreren Ports.

Minderung

Blockieren Sie ausgehende Kommunikationen zu den identifizierten Vercel-Domains und beschränken Sie den Abgang auf die Ports 1244, 1249 und 22411–22412. Überwachen Sie die Erstellung von Windows Update Script.pyw in Autostart-Ordnern, geplante Aufgaben mit dem Namen „Runtime Broker“ und verdächtige Ausführungen von msedge.exe, die mit Miner-Verkleidung übereinstimmen. Erkennen Sie Node.js-Prozesse, die Function.constructor aufrufen, sowie anomales HTTP-POST-Verhalten zu /keys-Endpunkten. Reduzieren Sie die Exposition, indem Sie die Automatisierung von VSCode-Aufgaben deaktivieren und Paketskripte vor der Ausführung von npm install oder dem Ausführen von Build-Schritten in nicht vertrauenswürdigen Repositories überprüfen.

Reaktion

Wenn Indikatoren beobachtet werden, isolieren Sie das betroffene System, beenden Sie verdächtige Prozesse und bewahren Sie Speicher- und Festplattenartefakte für eine forensische Überprüfung. Widerrufen Sie jegliche offengelegten MongoDB-Anmeldeinformationen und rotieren Sie alle relevanten Dienstkontogeheimnisse. Führen Sie eine Konto- und Zugriffsübersicht durch, um betroffene Benutzer zu identifizieren, setzen Sie dann Anmeldedaten zurück und entwerten Sie aktive Sitzungen/Tokens. Benachrichtigen Sie interne Stakeholder und koordinieren Sie sich mit Strafverfolgungsbehörden, wenn es Hinweise auf Kryptowährungsdiebstahl oder Wallet-Kompromittierung gibt.

„graph TB %% Klassendefinitionen classDef technique fill:#cce5ff classDef artifact fill:#e2f7d6 %% Schritt 1 – Phishing über einen Dienst tech_phishing[„Technik – T1566.003 Phishing: Spearphishing über einen Dienst Beschreibung: Angreifer gab sich als Freelancer auf Upwork aus und veröffentlichte ein gefälschtes Vorstellungsgespräch, um ein bösartiges Code-Repository zu liefern.“] class tech_phishing technique artifact_upwork[„Artefakt – Name: Gefälschte Upwork-Stellenanzeige Zweck: Opfer dazu verleiten, das bösartige Repository herunterzuladen.“] class artifact_upwork artifact tech_phishing u002du002d>|liefert| artifact_upwork %% Schritt 2 – Lieferkettenkompromittierung tech_supplychain[„Technik – T1195.001 Lieferkettenkompromittierung: Kompromittierung von Softwareabhängigkeiten und Entwicklungstools Beschreibung: Bösartiges VSCode <code>tasks.json</code> und JavaScript-Code in das Repository injiziert.“] class tech_supplychain technique artifact_tasksjson[„Artefakt – Name: VSCode <code>tasks.json</code> Inhalt: Bösartige Aufgaben-Definition, die Konstruktor der JavaScript-Funktion und <code>getCookie()</code> aufruft.“] class artifact_tasksjson artifact artifact_upwork u002du002d>|enthält| artifact_tasksjson artifact_tasksjson u002du002d>|ermöglicht| tech_supplychain %% Schritt 3 – Benutzer-Ausführung tech_userexec[„Technik – T1204.002 Benutzer-Ausführung: Bösartige Datei Beschreibung: Opfer öffnete den Projektordner in VSCode, was die Autou2011Ausführung der bösartigen Aufgaben auslöste.“] class tech_userexec technique artifact_tasksjson u002du002d>|ausgelöst durch| tech_userexec %% Schritt 4 – JavaScript-Ausführung tech_jsexec[„Technik – T1059.007 Kommando- und Skript-Interpreter: JavaScript Beschreibung: JavaScript wurde über VSCode-Aufgaben und Funktionskonstruktor ausgeführt, um zusätzliche Payloads herunterzuladen.“] class tech_jsexec technique tech_userexec u002du002d>|führt zu| tech_jsexec %% Schritt 5 – Python-Backdoor tech_python[„Technik – T1059.006 Kommando- und Skript-Interpreter: Python Beschreibung: Stark verschleierter Python-Backdoor (<code>bro_*.js</code>) wurde auf dem Opferhost heruntergeladen und ausgeführt.“] class tech_python technique artifact_python_backdoor[„Artefakt – Name: Verschleierter Python-Backdoor (<code>bro_*.js</code>) Merkmale: Mehrfach-verschlüsselte Kodierung und Dekodierung.“] class artifact_python_backdoor artifact tech_jsexec u002du002d>|lädt herunter| artifact_python_backdoor artifact_python_backdoor u002du002d>|führt aus| tech_python %% Schritt 6 – Startvorgangs-Persistenz tech_startup[„Technik – T1037.005 Start- oder Anmelde-Initiierungsskripts: Startobjekte Beschreibung: Persistenz durch Platzieren von <code>Windows Update Script.pyw</code> im Startordner.“] class tech_startup technique artifact_startup_script[„Artefakt – Name: <code>Windows Update Script.pyw</code> Ort: Startordner“] class artifact_startup_script artifact tech_python u002du002d>|erstellt| artifact_startup_script artifact_startup_script u002du002d>|ermöglicht| tech_startup %% Schritt 7 – Geplante Aufgabe tech_schedtask[„Technik – T1053 Geplante Aufgabe/Job Beschreibung: Geplante Aufgabe namens u201cRuntime Brokeru201d erstellt, die beim Anmelden ausgeführt wird.“] class tech_schedtask technique artifact_schedtask[„Artefakt – Name: Geplante Aufgabe u201cRuntime Brokeru201d Auslöser: Bei Benutzeranmeldung“] class artifact_schedtask artifact tech_startup u002du002d>|hinzugefügt| artifact_schedtask artifact_schedtask u002du002d>|führt aus| tech_schedtask %% Schritt 8 – Abgreifen von Anmeldeinformationen aus Browsern tech_credbrowser[„Technik – T1555.003 Anmeldeinformationen von Passwortspeichern: Anmeldeinformationen aus Webbrowsern Beschreibung: Malware erfasste Browserprofil-Daten und gespeicherte Anmeldeinformationen.“] class tech_credbrowser technique artifact_browser_data[„Artefakt – Daten: Extrahierte Browser-Passwörter und Cookies“] class artifact_browser_data artifact tech_schedtask u002du002d>|sammelt| tech_credbrowser tech_credbrowser u002du002d>|speichert| artifact_browser_data %% Schritt 9 – Web-Sitzungscookie stehlen tech_stealcookie[„Technik – T1539 Web-Sitzungscookie stehlen Beschreibung: <code>getCookie()</code>-Funktion rief Sitzungs-Cookies aus dem Browser des Opfers ab.“] class tech_stealcookie technique artifact_getcookie[„Artefakt – Daten: Sitzungs-Cookies, die aus Browsern erfasst wurden“] class artifact_getcookie artifact tech_credbrowser u002du002d>|ermöglicht| tech_stealcookie tech_stealcookie u002du002d>|produziert| artifact_getcookie %% Schritt 10 – Nutzung alternativen Authentifizierungsmaterials tech_altauth[„Technik – T1550.004 Nutzung alternativen Authentifizierungsmaterials: Web-Sitzungscookie Beschreibung: Abgegriffene Cookies wurden später verwendet, um authentifizierte Web-Sitzungen zu übernehmen.“] class tech_altauth technique artifact_getcookie u002du002d>|verwendet von| tech_altauth %% Schritt 11 – Tarnung tech_masquerade[„Technik – T1036.003 Tarnung: Umbenennung legitimer Dienstprogramme Beschreibung: Bösartige Binärdateien wurden umbenannt zu u201cRuntime Broker.exeu201d und u201cmsedge.exeu201d.“] class tech_masquerade technique artifact_renamed_bins[„Artefakt – Dateien: <code>Runtime Broker.exe</code>, <code>msedge.exe</code> (bösartig)“] class artifact_renamed_bins artifact tech_altauth u002du002d>|liefert| artifact_renamed_bins artifact_renamed_bins u002du002d>|verwendet in| tech_masquerade %% Schritt 12 – Beeinträchtigung der Verteidigung tech_impairdefense[„Technik – T1562 Beeinträchtigung der Verteidigung Beschreibung: Hinzugefügte Windows Defender-Ausschlüsse über PowerShell, um der Erkennung zu entgehen.“] class tech_impairdefense technique artifact_defender_exclusion[„Artefakt – Befehl: PowerShell-Skript zum Hinzufügen von Defender-Ausschlusspfaden“] class artifact_defender_exclusion artifact tech_masquerade u002du002d>|führt aus| artifact_defender_exclusion artifact_defender_exclusion u002du002d>|ermöglicht| tech_impairdefense %% Schritt 13 – Verschleierte Dateien tech_obfuscation[„Technik – T1027 Verschleierte Dateiformate oder Informationen Beschreibung: Payload verwendet 64 verschachtelte Verschleierungsschichten (Base85, XOR, zlib, umgekehrte Base64).“] class tech_obfuscation technique tech_impairdefense u002du002d>|schützt| tech_obfuscation %% Schritt 14 – Artefakte verstecken tech_hideartifacts[„Technik – T1564.012 Artefakte verstecken: Datei-/Pfadeinschlüsse Beschreibung: Defender-Ausschlüsse und versteckte Dateien genutzt, um bösartige Artefakte zu verbergen.“] class tech_hideartifacts technique tech_obfuscation u002du002d>|ermöglicht| tech_hideartifacts %% Schritt 15 – Dead-Drop Resolver tech_dead_drop[„Technik – T1102.001 Web-Dienst: Dead Drop Resolver Beschreibung: Malware bezog Befehle von einem Netzwerk von ~1.000 Dead-Drop-Pastebin-Konten.“] class tech_dead_drop technique artifact_pastebin[„Artefakt – Dienst: Pastebin Dead-Drop Resolver-Konten“] class artifact_pastebin artifact tech_hideartifacts u002du002d>|ruft ab| artifact_pastebin artifact_pastebin u002du002d>|liefert Befehle an| tech_dead_drop %% Schritt 16 – Exfiltration über FTP tech_exfilftp[„Technik – T1048.003 Exfiltration über alternative Protokolle: Unverschlüsseltes Nicht-C2-Protokoll Beschreibung: Gesammelte Daten wurden über FTP auf Port 21 exfiltriert.“] class tech_exfilftp technique artifact_ftp[„Artefakt – Protokoll: FTP (Port 21) genutzt für Datenübertragung“] class artifact_ftp artifact tech_dead_drop u002du002d>|sendet Daten über| tech_exfilftp tech_exfilftp u002du002d>|nutzt| artifact_ftp %% Schritt 17 – Ressourcenmissbrauch (Monero-Mining) tech_resourcehijack[„Technik – T1496.001 Ressourcenmissbrauch: Compute Hijacking Beschreibung: XMRig Monero Miner bereitgestellt, getarnt als u201cmsedge.exeu201d, um kompromittierte Hosts zu monetarisieren.“] class tech_resourcehijack technique artifact_xmrig[„Artefakt – Datei: XMRig Miner-Binärdatei, benannt <code>msedge.exe</code>“] class artifact_xmrig artifact tech_exfilftp u002du002d>|liefert Ressourcen für| tech_resourcehijack tech_resourcehijack u002du002d>|führt aus| artifact_xmrig %% Schritt 18 – Browser-Informationsentdeckung tech_browserdisc[„Technik – T1217 Browser-Informationsentdeckung Beschreibung: Angreifer enumerierten Browserinformationen, um zusätzliche Anmeldedaten und Sitzungsdaten zu lokalisieren.“] class tech_browserdisc technique artifact_browser_info[„Artefakt – Daten: Browserversion, Profilpfade, installierte Erweiterungen“] class artifact_browser_info artifact tech_resourcehijack u002du002d>|sammelt| tech_browserdisc tech_browserdisc u002du002d>|sammelt| artifact_browser_info „

Angriffsablauf

Ansehen

Simulation Ausführung

Voraussetzung: Der Telemetrie- & Basislinien-Pre‑flight-Check muss bestanden sein.

Angriffsablauf & Befehle

Der Angreifer kopiert die legitime RuntimeBroker.exe Binärdatei an einen unüblichen Standort (%TEMP%), um sich als vertrauenswürdiger Prozess zu tarnen und so die Erkennung durch bekannte Systempfade zu umgehen. Durch die Ausführung der Kopie enthält das Prozess-Erstellungs-Ereignis den erwarteten Bildnamen, jedoch einen Pfad, der in der „System32“-Einschlussprüfung fehlschlägt, wodurch selection_runtime.

Regressionstest-Skript

# -----------------------------------------------
# TC-20260114-A1B2C – Tarnungs-Simulation
# -----------------------------------------------

# 1. Definiere Pfade
$src  = "$env:SystemRootSystem32RuntimeBroker.exe"
$dest = "$env:TEMPRuntimeBroker.exe"

# 2. Kopiere die legitime Binärdatei in ein Nicht-Systemverzeichnis
Copy-Item -Path $src -Destination $dest -Force

# 3. Führe die kopierte Binärdatei aus (dies sollte die Sigma-Regel auslösen)
Start-Process -FilePath $dest -WindowStyle Hidden

# 4. OPTIONAL: Simuliere das msedge-Tarnungs-(Miner)-Szenario
#    (Kopiere eine beliebige harmlose ausführbare Datei, benenne sie in msedge.exe um und platziere sie unter %LOCALAPPDATA%MicrosoftWindowsApplications)
$minerSrc  = "$env:SystemRootSystem32notepad.exe"
$minerDest = "$env:LOCALAPPDATAMicrosoftWindowsApplicationsmsedge.exe"
Copy-Item -Path $minerSrc -Destination $minerDest -Force
Start-Process -FilePath $minerDest -WindowStyle Hidden
# -----------------------------------------------

Bereinigungsbefehle

# Entferne die bösartigen Kopien
Remove-Item -Path "$env:TEMPRuntimeBroker.exe" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item -Path "$env:LOCALAPPDATAMicrosoftWindowsApplicationsmsedge.exe" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

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Name	Descripiton
PHPSESSID	Preserves user session state across page requests. Cookie generated by applications based on the PHP language. This is a general purpose identifier used to maintain user session variables. It is normally a random generated number, how it is used can be specific to the site, but a good example is maintaining a logged-in status for a user between pages.
sp_i	Used to store information about authenticated User.
sp_r	Used to store information about authenticated User.
sp_a	Used to store information about authenticated User.

Name	Descripiton
tuuid	Collects anonymous data related to the user's visits to the website, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded.
tuuid_last_update	Collects anonymous data related to the user's visits to the website, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded.
um	Collects anonymous data related to the user's visits to the website, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded.
umeh	Collects anonymous data related to the user's visits to the website, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded.
na_sc_x	Used by the social sharing platform AddThis to keep a record of parts of the site that has been visited in order to recommend other parts of the site.
APID	Collects anonymous data related to the user's visits to the website.
IDSYNC	Collects anonymous data related to the user's visits to the website.
_cc_aud	Collects anonymous statistical data related to the user's website visits, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded. The purpose is to segment the website's users according to factors such as demographics and geographical location, in order to enable media and marketing agencies to structure and understand their target groups to enable customised online advertising.
_cc_cc	Collects anonymous statistical data related to the user's website visits, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded. The purpose is to segment the website's users according to factors such as demographics and geographical location, in order to enable media and marketing agencies to structure and understand their target groups to enable customised online advertising.
_cc_dc	Collects anonymous statistical data related to the user's website visits, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded. The purpose is to segment the website's users according to factors such as demographics and geographical location, in order to enable media and marketing agencies to structure and understand their target groups to enable customised online advertising.
_cc_id	Collects anonymous statistical data related to the user's website visits, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded. The purpose is to segment the website's users according to factors such as demographics and geographical location, in order to enable media and marketing agencies to structure and understand their target groups to enable customised online advertising.
dpm	Via a unique ID that is used for semantic content analysis, the user's navigation on the website is registered and linked to offline data from surveys and similar registrations to display targeted ads.
acs	Collects anonymous data related to the user's visits to the website, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded, with the purpose of displaying targeted ads.
clid	Collects anonymous data related to the user's visits to the website, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded, with the purpose of displaying targeted ads.
KRTBCOOKIE_#	Registers a unique ID that identifies the user's device during return visits across websites that use the same ad network. The ID is used to allow targeted ads.
PUBMDCID	Registers a unique ID that identifies the user's device during return visits across websites that use the same ad network. The ID is used to allow targeted ads.
PugT	Registers a unique ID that identifies the user's device during return visits across websites that use the same ad network. The ID is used to allow targeted ads.
ssi	Registers a unique ID that identifies a returning user's device. The ID is used for targeted ads.
_tmid	Registers a unique ID that identifies the user's device upon return visits. The ID is used to target ads in video clips.
wam-sync	Used by the advertising platform Weborama to determine the visitor's interests based on pages visits, content clicked and other actions on the website.
wui	Used by the advertising platform Weborama to determine the visitor's interests based on pages visits, content clicked and other actions on the website.
AFFICHE_W	Used by the advertising platform Weborama to determine the visitor's interests based on pages visits, content clicked and other actions on the website.
B	Collects anonymous data related to the user's website visits, such as the number of visits, average time spent on the website and what pages have been loaded. The registered data is used to categorise the users' interest and demographical profiles with the purpose of customising the website content depending on the visitor.
1P_JAR	These cookies are used to gather website statistics, and track conversion rates.
APISID	Google set a number of cookies on any page that includes a Google reCAPTCHA. While we have no control over the cookies set by Google, they appear to include a mixture of pieces of information to measure the number and behaviour of Google reCAPTCHA users.
HSID	Google set a number of cookies on any page that includes a Google reCAPTCHA. While we have no control over the cookies set by Google, they appear to include a mixture of pieces of information to measure the number and behaviour of Google reCAPTCHA users.
NID	Google set a number of cookies on any page that includes a Google reCAPTCHA. While we have no control over the cookies set by Google, they appear to include a mixture of pieces of information to measure the number and behaviour of Google reCAPTCHA users.
SAPISID	Google set a number of cookies on any page that includes a Google reCAPTCHA. While we have no control over the cookies set by Google, they appear to include a mixture of pieces of information to measure the number and behaviour of Google reCAPTCHA users.
SID	Google set a number of cookies on any page that includes a Google reCAPTCHA. While we have no control over the cookies set by Google, they appear to include a mixture of pieces of information to measure the number and behaviour of Google reCAPTCHA users.
SIDCC	Security cookie to protect users data from unauthorised access.
SSID	Google set a number of cookies on any page that includes a Google reCAPTCHA. While we have no control over the cookies set by Google, they appear to include a mixture of pieces of information to measure the number and behaviour of Google reCAPTCHA users.
__utmx	This cookie is associated with Google Website Optimizer, a tool designed to help site owners improve their wbesites. It is used to distinguish between two varaitions a webpage that might be shown to a visitor as part of an A/B split test. This helps site owners to detemine which version of a page performs better, and therefore helps to improve the website.
__utmxx	This cookie is associated with Google Website Optimizer, a tool designed to help site owners improve their wbesites. It is used to distinguish between two varaitions a webpage that might be shown to a visitor as part of an A/B split test. This helps site owners to detemine which version of a page performs better, and therefore helps to improve the website.

Name	Descripiton
_hjid	Hotjar cookie. This cookie is set when the customer first lands on a page with the Hotjar script. It is used to persist the random user ID, unique to that site on the browser. This ensures that behavior in subsequent visits to the same site will be attributed to the same user ID.
_hjIncludedInSample	This cookie is associated with web analytics functionality and services from Hot Jar, a Malta based company. It uniquely identifies a visitor during a single browser session and indicates they are included in an audience sample.
intercom-id-[xxx]	This cookie is used by Intercom as a session so that users can continue a chat as they move through the site.
intercom-session-[xxx]	Used to keeping track of sessions and remember logins and conversations.
demdex	Via a unique ID that is used for semantic content analysis, the user's navigation on the website is registered and linked to offline data from surveys and similar registrations to display targeted ads.
CookieConsent	Stores the user's cookie consent state for the current domain.
__cfduid	Used by the content network, Cloudflare, to identify trusted web traffic.
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Name	Descripiton
_ga	This cookie name is asssociated with Google Universal Analytics - which is a significant update to Google's more commonly used analytics service. This cookie is used to distinguish unique users by assigning a randomly generated number as a client identifier. It is included in each page. Registers a unique ID that is used to generate statistical data on how the visitor uses the website. request in a site and used to calculate visitor, session and campaign data for the sites analytics reports. By default it is set to expire after 2 years, although this is customisable by website owners.
_gat	Used by Google Analytics to throttle request rate. This cookie name is associated with Google Universal Analytics, according to documentation it is used to throttle the request rate - limiting the collection of data on high traffic sites. It expires after 10 minutes.
_gid	This cookie name is asssociated with Google Universal Analytics. This appears to be a new cookie and as of Spring 2017 no information is available from Google. It appears to store and update a unique value for each page visited. Registers a unique ID that is used to generate statistical data on how the visitor uses the website.
IDE	Used by Google DoubleClick to register and report the website user's actions after viewing or clicking one of the advertiser's ads with the purpose of measuring the efficacy of an ad and to present targeted ads to the user.
r/collect	Used by Google DoubleClick to register and report the website user's actions after viewing or clicking one of the advertiser's ads with the purpose of measuring the efficacy of an ad and to present targeted ads to the user.
test_cookie	Used to check if the user's browser supports cookies.
collect	Used to send data to Google Analytics about the visitor's device and behaviour. Tracks the visitor across devices and marketing channels.
ads/user-lists/#	These cookies may be set through our site by our advertising partners. They may be used by those companies to build a profile of your interests and show you relevant adverts on other sites.
c	Registers anonymised user data, such as IP address, geographical location, visited websites, and what ads the user has clicked, with the purpose of optimising ad display based on the user's movement on websites that use the same ad network.
khaos	Registers anonymised user data, such as IP address, geographical location, visited websites, and what ads the user has clicked, with the purpose of optimising ad display based on the user's movement on websites that use the same ad network.
put_#	Registers anonymised user data, such as IP address, geographical location, visited websites, and what ads the user has clicked, with the purpose of optimising ad display based on the user's movement on websites that use the same ad network.
rpb	Registers anonymised user data, such as IP address, geographical location, visited websites, and what ads the user has clicked, with the purpose of optimising ad display based on the user's movement on websites that use the same ad network.
rpx	Registers anonymised user data, such as IP address, geographical location, visited websites, and what ads the user has clicked, with the purpose of optimising ad display based on the user's movement on websites that use the same ad network.
tap.php	Registers anonymised user data, such as IP address, geographical location, visited websites, and what ads the user has clicked, with the purpose of optimising ad display based on the user's movement on websites that use the same ad network.