Wpcdoor Malware Spreads Through Korea-Based DVR Management Software
Detection stack
- AIDR
- Alert
- ETL
- Query
Summary
Threat actor Larva-26013 is distributing the Wpcdoor backdoor by abusing Korea-developed DVR management software. The attack chain relies on DLL side-loading to execute several downloader stages. Once deployed, the malware steals sensitive information, including browser credentials and cryptocurrency wallet seed phrases.
Investigation
The investigation analyzed infection activity from a Korean company’s ASD logs and examined malware samples including CMS.exe and IPHLPAPI.DLL. Researchers identified a multi-stage infection chain combining DLL side-loading with memory-only execution. Analysis also confirmed the use of specific XOR encryption keys and custom packet structures for C&C communication.
Mitigation
Users should install the latest security updates for supported software and operating systems. Organizations should review and harden the security configuration of DVR and CCTV management applications. Strict application control and DLL loading restrictions can further reduce the risk of unauthorized code execution.
Response
When Wpcdoor activity is detected, immediately isolate affected systems to limit additional data exfiltration. Change usernames and passwords associated with the compromised DVR management software and connected systems. Perform a comprehensive forensic investigation to determine the scope of data theft, with particular attention to browser credentials and cryptocurrency wallets.
Attack Flow
We are still updating this part.
Detections
Suspicious File Exstension Added to Run Keys [ASEPs] (via registry_event)
Possible Iphlpapi Library Side Loading (via image_load)
IOCs (HashMd5) to detect: Malware Analysis of Wpcdoor Attack Cases Spread via Korea-Based DVR Management Software
IOCs (SourceIP) to detect: Malware Analysis of Wpcdoor Attack Cases Spread via Korea-Based DVR Management Software
IOCs (DestinationIP) to detect: Malware Analysis of Wpcdoor Attack Cases Spread via Korea-Based DVR Management Software
Wpcdoor C&C Server Communication [Windows Network Connection]
Wpcdoor Backdoor Distribution via DVR Management Software [Windows Process Creation]
Simulation Execution
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Attack Narrative & Commands: The adversary has successfully deployed Wpcdoor via DLL side-loading. To move from initial access to active control, the malware must “phone home” to its C&C server. The attacker initiates a connection to the IP
144.172.116.37on port 80/443 to check for pending commands. This action generates a network connection event from a local process to the blacklisted IP, which is the specific telemetry this rule monitors. -
Regression Test Script:
# Simulation script to mimic Wpcdoor C&C communication # This script opens a TCP connection to one of the IPs defined in the detection logic. $C2_IP = "144.172.116.37" $Port = 80 Write-Host "[+] Starting Wpcdoor C&C Simulation..." -ForegroundColor Cyan Write-Host "[+] Attempting connection to $C2_IP on port $Port" -ForegroundColor Yellow try { $tcpClient = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TcpClient $connection = $tcpClient.BeginConnect($C2_IP, $Port, $null, $null) $wait = $connection.AsyncWaitHandle.WaitOne(5000, $false) if (!$wait) { Write-Host "[!] Connection timed out (as expected if IP is unreachable), but telemetry should be generated." -ForegroundColor Green } else { Write-Host "[!] Connection successful!" -ForegroundColor Green } $tcpClient.Close() } catch { Write-Host "[!] Error during simulation: $_" -ForegroundColor Red } Write-Host "[+] Simulation Complete." -ForegroundColor Cyan -
Cleanup Commands:
# No persistent changes made; cleaning up any potential temporary files if they were created Remove-Item -Path "$env:TEMPwpcdoor_sim.tmp" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Write-Host "[+] Cleanup complete." -ForegroundColor Green