SOC Prime Bias: Critical

23 Oct 2026 14:18 UTC

UAC-0099 and Sandworm Deploy MythicRatatoskr Backdoor via Yggdrasil

Author Photo
SOC Prime Team linkedin icon Follow
UAC-0099 and Sandworm Deploy MythicRatatoskr Backdoor via Yggdrasil
shield icon

Detection stack

  • AIDR
  • Alert
  • ETL
  • Query

Summary

Affiliates associated with INC and The Gentlemen ransomware groups are leveraging an AI-driven intrusion ecosystem to automate reconnaissance, command generation, and data triage. The operators use a custom framework called Phantom alongside commercial LLMs to support large-scale intrusions. The infrastructure was exposed after significant OPSEC failures revealed command-and-control servers and stored AI session data.

Investigation

The investigation started after researchers found an exposed command-and-control server at 45.227.254.43 hosting open directories containing Phantom source code and AI session databases. Analysis of exposed configuration files and credentials subsequently uncovered six additional adversary-controlled servers. Researchers identified a highly automated workflow in which AI performs much of the technical execution while human operators maintain oversight.

Mitigation

Organizations should prioritize patching edge systems, especially FortiClient EMS, SimpleHelp, and cPanel, to close common initial access paths. Enforcing multi-factor authentication (MFA) across RMM, VPN, and remote access platforms is essential to reduce credential reuse risk. Defenders should also enable EDR tamper protection and monitor for unauthorized termination of security services or loading of known vulnerable drivers.

Response

When malicious activity is identified, isolate affected edge devices and audit administrative accounts in EMS and RMM platforms for unauthorized additions. Review VPN connection scripts for suspicious changes and rotate compromised credentials immediately. Conduct a thorough examination of scheduled tasks and active reverse SOCKS tunnels to identify and terminate persistent C2 channels.

Attack Flow

We are still updating this part.

Detections

Short File Name (via cmdline)

SOC Prime Team
23 Oct 2026

Possible Persistence Points [ASEPs – Software/NTUSER Hive] (via registry_event)

SOC Prime Team
22 Oct 2026

Suspicious Scheduled Task (via audit)

SOC Prime Team
22 Oct 2026

Suspicious Command and Control by Unusual Top Level Domain (TLD) DNS Request (via dns)

SOC Prime Team
22 Oct 2026

Possible Dynamic DNS Service Was Contacted (via dns)

SOC Prime Team
22 Oct 2026

IOCs (HashSha1) to detect: ESET Research MythicRatatoskr: An Yggdrasil-enabled backdoor deployed in a UAC-0099-Sandworm collaboration

SOC Prime AI Rules
22 Oct 2026

IOCs (SourceIP) to detect: ESET Research MythicRatatoskr: An Yggdrasil-enabled backdoor deployed in a UAC-0099-Sandworm collaboration

SOC Prime AI Rules
22 Oct 2026

IOCs (DestinationIP) to detect: ESET Research MythicRatatoskr: An Yggdrasil-enabled backdoor deployed in a UAC-0099-Sandworm collaboration

SOC Prime AI Rules
22 Oct 2026

MythicRatatoskr Configuration Path Detection [Windows File Event]

SOC Prime AI Rules
22 Oct 2026

Detection of MATCHWOK and MythicRatatoskr Backdoor Execution [Windows Process Creation]

SOC Prime AI Rules
22 Oct 2026

UAC-0099 Scheduled Task Deployment of MATCHBOIL Downloader [Windows Powershell]

SOC Prime AI Rules
22 Oct 2026

Simulation Execution

  • Attack Narrative & Commands: The adversary aims to establish persistence on the target host using the MythicRatatoskr backdoor. To simulate the detection, the attacker will perform three distinct actions: 1) Execute a command containing the specific “MATCHWOK backdoor” string to trigger selection1; 2) Drop a malicious binary at the highly specific path C:windowssystem32updater.exe to trigger selection2; and 3) Create a new Windows Service named WindowsDefenderSvc.exe to trigger selection3. This mimics the multi-stage deployment where initial access leads to high-privilege persistence.

  • Regression Test Script:

    # Simulation Script for MATCHWOK/MythicRatatoskr Detection Validation
    # NOTE: This script must be run with Administrator privileges.
    
    Write-Host "[*] Starting Simulation..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
    
    # 1. Trigger Selection 1: CommandLine contains 'MATCHWOK backdoor'
    Write-Host "[+] Triggering Selection 1 (Command Line)..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
    Start-Process cmd.exe -ArgumentList "/c echo This is a simulation of the MATCHWOK backdoor execution" -WindowStyle Hidden
    
    # 2. Trigger Selection 2: Image is 'C:windowssystem32updater.exe'
    Write-Host "[+] Triggering Selection 2 (File Path)..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
    $targetPath = "C:WindowsSystem32updater.exe"
    if (Test-Path $targetPath) { Remove-Item $targetPath -Force }
    New-Item -Path $targetPath -ItemType File -Force | Out-Null
    Start-Process $targetPath -ArgumentList "/silent" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    
    # 3. Trigger Selection 3: ServiceName is 'WindowsDefenderSvc.exe'
    Write-Host "[+] Triggering Selection 3 (Service Name)..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
    $serviceName = "WindowsDefenderSvc.exe"
    # Creating a dummy service that runs 'cmd.exe'
    New-Service -Name $serviceName -BinaryPathName "C:WindowsSystem32cmd.exe /c echo persistence" -DisplayName "Windows Defender Security Service" -StartupType Manual
    
    Write-Host "[*] Simulation Complete." -ForegroundColor Green
  • Cleanup Commands:

    # Cleanup Script
    Write-Host "[!] Cleaning up simulation artifacts..." -ForegroundColor Red
    
    # Remove the service
    Stop-Service -Name "WindowsDefenderSvc.exe" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    sc.exe delete "WindowsDefenderSvc.exe"
    
    # Remove the malicious file
    Remove-Item "C:WindowsSystem32updater.exe" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    
    Write-Host "[*] Cleanup Finished." -ForegroundColor Green