CVE-2026-84869: ScreenConnect Exploited to Run Malicious Files
Detection stack
- AIDR
- Alert
- ETL
- Query
Summary
Threat actors are exploiting CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect to execute malicious files on MSP technician workstations. The campaign involves spraying servers with weaponized batch files designed to trigger when technicians join sessions. Successful attacks deploy a rebranded ScreenConnect client called SCKit to maintain persistent remote access.
Investigation
Huntress observed a complete compromise occurring within nine seconds of a technician joining an affected session. The attack chain began with execution of a guest-pushed batch file, followed by a PowerShell relaunch, communication through a Telegram bot, and download of an MSI installer. The sequence ultimately deployed a rogue client named WindowsUpdate.WindowsClient.exe.
Mitigation
The primary mitigation is to update all ScreenConnect host clients to version 26.6.5 or later. As a temporary measure, administrators should remove the TransferFiles permission from relevant roles and session groups. Restricting guest session access and reviewing existing permissions is also recommended.
Response
When malicious activity is detected, immediately isolate the affected technician workstation. Terminate rogue client processes and remove associated files from %LOCALAPPDATA% and %TEMP%. Restore the seclogon service to its expected start configuration and rotate all credentials accessible from the workstation, including RMM, PSA, and password vault credentials.
Attack Flow
We are still updating this part.
Detections
Alternative Remote Access / Management Software (via process_creation)
Possible Account or Group Enumeration / Manipulation (via cmdline)
Suspicious CURL Usage (via cmdline)
Suspicious Binary / Scripts in Autostart Location (via file_event)
IOCs (HashSha256) to detect: CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect Exploited to Run Malicious Files on MSP Technician Accounts
IOCs (SourceIP) to detect: CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect Exploited to Run Malicious Files on MSP Technician Accounts Part 2
IOCs (SourceIP) to detect: CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect Exploited to Run Malicious Files on MSP Technician Accounts Part 1
IOCs (DestinationIP) to detect: CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect Exploited to Run Malicious Files on MSP Technician Accounts Part 2
IOCs (DestinationIP) to detect: CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect Exploited to Run Malicious Files on MSP Technician Accounts Part 1
ScreenConnect Rogue Client Execution via CVE-2026-84869 [Windows Sysmon]
Rogue ScreenConnect Client Execution via PowerShell Start-Process [Windows Powershell]
CVE-2026-84869 ScreenConnect Malicious File Execution [Windows Process Creation]
Simulation Execution
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Attack Narrative & Commands: An adversary leverages a vulnerability in the ScreenConnect remote access software. By sending a specially crafted request, the attacker forces the ScreenConnect service to execute a shell command. The goal is to establish a foothold on the technician’s workstation. The attacker will first attempt to spawn
cmd.exeto explore the environment, followed bypowershell.exeto download a secondary stager viacurl.exe. This sequence mimics the behavior described in the CVE-2026-84869 exploitation pattern. -
Regression Test Script:
# Simulation Script: CVE-2026-84869 Execution Emulation # Note: This script simulates the 'ScreenConnect' parent process by creating # a dummy process to ensure the detection logic triggers correctly. $SimulatedParentPath = "$env:TEMPScreenConnect.exe" $DummyContent = @' using System; using System.Runtime.InteropServices; public class Dummy { [DllImport("kernel32.dll")] public static extern IntPtr CreateProcess(string lpApplicationName, string lpCommandLine, IntPtr lpProcessAttributes, IntPtr lpThreadAttributes, bool bInheritHandles, uint dwCreationFlags, IntPtr lpEnvironment, string lpCurrentDirectory, ref STARTUPINFO lpStartupInfo, out PROCESS_INFORMATION lpProcessInformation); public struct STARTUPINFO { public uint cb; public string lpReserved; public string lpDesktop; public string lpTitle; public uint dwX; public uint dwY; public uint dwXSize; public uint dwYSize; public uint dwXCountChars; public uint dwYCountChars; public uint dwFillAttribute; public uint dwFlags; public short wShowWindow; public short cbReserved2; public IntPtr lpReserved2; public IntPtr hStdInput; public IntPtr hStdOutput; public IntPtr hStdError; } public struct PROCESS_INFORMATION { public IntPtr hProcess; public IntPtr hThread; public uint dwProcessId; public uint dwThreadId; } } '@ # 1. Create a dummy executable that mimics ScreenConnect $Code = @" using System; using System.Diagnostics; using System.IO; class Program { static void Main() { Console.WriteLine("Simulating ScreenConnect Service..."); // We hold the process open to act as a parent System.Threading.Thread.Sleep(60000); } } "@ $Code | Out-File "$env:TEMPScreenConnectSim.cs" Add-Type -TypeDefinition $Code -OutputAssembly "$SimulatedParentPath" -OutputType ConsoleApplication # 2. Start the simulated ScreenConnect parent process Start-Process -FilePath $SimulatedParentPath -WindowStyle Hidden # Wait for process to initialize Start-Sleep -Seconds 2 # 3. Execute the malicious child processes (The actual TTPs) Write-Host "[!] Triggering Detection: Spawning cmd.exe from ScreenConnect..." Start-Process -FilePath "cmd.exe" -ArgumentList "/c echo Exploited" -WorkingDirectory $env:TEMP Write-Host "[!] Triggering Detection: Spawning powershell.exe from ScreenConnect..." Start-Process -FilePath "powershell.exe" -ArgumentList "-Command Write-Host 'Exploitation Payload Stage 1'" -WorkingDirectory $env:TEMP Write-Host "[!] Triggering Detection: Spawning curl.exe from ScreenConnect..." Start-Process -FilePath "curl.exe" -ArgumentList "-I https://www.google.com" -WorkingDirectory $env:TEMP Write-Host "[+] Simulation complete. Check your SIEM for alerts." -
Cleanup Commands:
# Cleanup Simulation Stop-Process -Name "ScreenConnectSim" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Remove-Item "$env:TEMPScreenConnectSim.cs" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Remove-Item "$env:TEMPScreenConnect.exe" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue