ClickFix Campaign Uses Amazon Lures to Deploy Malware
Detection stack
- AIDR
- Alert
- ETL
- Query
Summary
Threat actors are abusing sponsored Google search results for “amazon business” to redirect users to a spoofed Amazon login page. The site uses a ClickFix social engineering technique to trick victims into executing a command through the Windows Run dialog. That command abuses the legacy finger utility to download and launch a multi-stage malware chain involving Doina, Lumma Stealer, and NetSupport RMM.
Investigation
Huntress investigated multiple incidents linked to an Amazon-themed ClickFix campaign. Analysts reverse-engineered the infection chain and identified the finger utility being abused as a LOLBIN to retrieve a weaponized .plan file. The investigation traced the deployment of IronPython, the Doina RAT, and eventually Lumma Stealer through a Node.js-based loader.
Mitigation
The primary defense is user awareness around fake CAPTCHA prompts that instruct users to execute terminal commands. Organizations should consider disabling the Windows Run dialog for users who do not require it through managed endpoint security controls. Monitoring for unusual traffic over TCP port 79 used by finger and malvertising indicators in web logs can also support early detection.
Response
When this activity is detected, isolate affected endpoints to prevent further data exfiltration or lateral movement. Review and block identified barbecue-themed C2 domains and malicious IP addresses. Conduct a thorough hunt for unauthorized RMM software such as NetSupport and suspicious Node.js processes executing from non-standard locations including C:\ProgramData.
Attack Flow
We are still updating this part.
Detections
Call Suspicious .NET Methods from Powershell (via powershell)
NodeJS Binary Executing From Uncommon Location (via cmdline)
LOLBAS Finger (via cmdline)
LOLBAS Conhost (via cmdline)
Suspicious CURL Usage (via cmdline)
IOCs (HashSha256) to detect: Amazon-Themed ClickFix Campaign Serves Up Finger-Licking Malware
IOCs (SourceIP) to detect: Amazon-Themed ClickFix Campaign Serves Up Finger-Licking Malware
IOCs (DestinationIP) to detect: Amazon-Themed ClickFix Campaign Serves Up Finger-Licking Malware
Detection of Port 79/tcp and Nonstandard Port for NetSupport Client Communications [Windows Network Connection]
Execution of Finger Utility and IronPython for Malicious Script Execution [Windows Process Creation]
Simulation Execution
-
Attack Narrative & Commands: An adversary has gained initial access and is attempting to establish persistence and command-and-control (C2). To blend in with common administrative traffic and exploit known protocol vulnerabilities, they utilize a Python script to initiate a connection on Port 79 (Finger protocol). Simultaneously, they attempt to use a NetSupport Client instance to transfer tools, specifically targeting a known malicious IP (172.148.201.106) on port 725 to maintain a backdoor.
-
Regression Test Script:
# Simulation script to trigger detection rule # Requirement: Python must be installed on the target Write-Host "[+] Starting Simulation..." # 1. Trigger Selection One: Connection to Port 79 Write-Host "[+] Triggering Port 79 (Finger) connection..." python -c "import socket; s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM); s.connect(('127.0.0.1', 79)); s.close()" # 2. Trigger Selection Two: Connection to 172.148.201.106 on Port 725 Write-Host "[+] Triggering NetSupport (IP: 172.148.201.106, Port: 725) connection..." python -c "import socket; s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM); s.connect(('172.148.201.106', 725)); s.close()" Write-Host "[+] Simulation Complete." -
Cleanup Commands:
# No persistent artifacts created by this script; # however, ensure any temporary python processes are terminated. Stop-Process -Name "python" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue