Cereal Malware Toolset Linked to the Turla APT Group
Detection stack
- AIDR
- Alert
- ETL
- Query
Summary
ESET has uncovered a new modular .NET malware toolset called Cereal, attributed to the Turla APT group. The framework is specifically built to target Microsoft Exchange servers for long-term cyberespionage. It uses advanced techniques such as hijacking email transport pipelines and abusing the .NET native image cache to maintain stealth and evade detection.
Investigation
The investigation began after researchers detected suspicious activity on a government Exchange server in Kazakhstan in November 2025. Further analysis exposed a modular toolset containing components such as CerealLoader and CerealBox. Additional telemetry later revealed similar activity targeting a Romanian government organization in December 2025.
Mitigation
Organizations should monitor for abnormal .NET execution behavior, particularly unmanaged entry points and Vtable fixups. Hardening Microsoft Exchange environments and detecting unauthorized changes to the EdgeTransport.exe process or existing transport agents are critical. Auditing the .NET native image cache for unexpected DLLs can also help uncover persistence mechanisms.
Response
When malicious activity is detected, responders should isolate the affected Exchange server and perform memory forensic analysis to identify injected modules. Review web traffic for unusual URL paths associated with CerealNeuron communication patterns. Conduct a comprehensive audit of installed Exchange transport agents and system-level .NET assemblies for unauthorized modifications.
Attack Flow
We are still updating this part.
Detections
Unsigned Dynamic Library Was Loaded From System Folder (via sysmon)
Possible Process Injection (via sysmon)
Possible Wbemcomn / Netutils Dynamic Library Side-Loading Attempt (via image_load)
Possible Version.dll Masquerading Attempt (via image_load)
Possible Ncobjapi Dynamic Library Possible Side-Loading Attempt (via image_load)
Possible Lateral Movement via Remote Registry [correlate/bucket_span_10m] (via audit)
Turla Cereal Toolset Components Detection [Windows Process Creation]
Simulation Execution
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Attack Narrative & Commands: An adversary has successfully compromised an environment and is attempting to deploy the Turla Cereal toolset to establish command-and-control (C2) capabilities. To avoid detection by basic AV, they attempt to run the
CerealLoadercomponent. The adversary’s goal is to execute the loader which will then side-load malicious DLLs into a legitimate process. The simulation will mimic this by executing a dummy process with the exact command-line argumentCerealLoaderto verify if the SOC receives the alert. -
Regression Test Script:
# Simulation script to trigger the Turla Cereal detection rule. # This mimics the execution of the CerealLoader component. $TargetString = "CerealLoader" Write-Host "[+] Starting simulation: Executing process with command line containing $TargetString" # We use cmd.exe to execute a dummy command that includes the target string in the arguments. Start-Process "cmd.exe" -ArgumentList "/c echo Simulation of $TargetString execution" -WindowStyle Hidden Write-Host "[+] Simulation command sent. Check SIEM for alert." -
Cleanup Commands:
# No permanent files were created during this simulation. # If files were dropped, they would be removed here. Write-Host "[+] Cleanup complete. No artifacts to remove."