SOC Prime Bias: Critical

19 Nov 2026 12:27 UTC

CVE-2026-84869: ScreenConnect Exploited to Run Malicious Files

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CVE-2026-84869: ScreenConnect Exploited to Run Malicious Files
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Detection stack

  • AIDR
  • Alert
  • ETL
  • Query

Summary

Threat actors are exploiting CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect to execute malicious files on MSP technician workstations. The campaign involves spraying servers with weaponized batch files designed to trigger when technicians join sessions. Successful attacks deploy a rebranded ScreenConnect client called SCKit to maintain persistent remote access.

Investigation

Huntress observed a complete compromise occurring within nine seconds of a technician joining an affected session. The attack chain began with execution of a guest-pushed batch file, followed by a PowerShell relaunch, communication through a Telegram bot, and download of an MSI installer. The sequence ultimately deployed a rogue client named WindowsUpdate.WindowsClient.exe.

Mitigation

The primary mitigation is to update all ScreenConnect host clients to version 26.6.5 or later. As a temporary measure, administrators should remove the TransferFiles permission from relevant roles and session groups. Restricting guest session access and reviewing existing permissions is also recommended.

Response

When malicious activity is detected, immediately isolate the affected technician workstation. Terminate rogue client processes and remove associated files from %LOCALAPPDATA% and %TEMP%. Restore the seclogon service to its expected start configuration and rotate all credentials accessible from the workstation, including RMM, PSA, and password vault credentials.

Attack Flow

We are still updating this part.

Detections

Alternative Remote Access / Management Software (via process_creation)

SOC Prime Team
18 Nov 2026

Possible Account or Group Enumeration / Manipulation (via cmdline)

SOC Prime Team
18 Nov 2026

Suspicious CURL Usage (via cmdline)

SOC Prime Team
18 Nov 2026

Suspicious Binary / Scripts in Autostart Location (via file_event)

SOC Prime Team
18 Nov 2026

IOCs (HashSha256) to detect: CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect Exploited to Run Malicious Files on MSP Technician Accounts

SOC Prime AI Rules
18 Nov 2026

IOCs (SourceIP) to detect: CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect Exploited to Run Malicious Files on MSP Technician Accounts Part 2

SOC Prime AI Rules
18 Nov 2026

IOCs (SourceIP) to detect: CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect Exploited to Run Malicious Files on MSP Technician Accounts Part 1

SOC Prime AI Rules
18 Nov 2026

IOCs (DestinationIP) to detect: CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect Exploited to Run Malicious Files on MSP Technician Accounts Part 2

SOC Prime AI Rules
18 Nov 2026

IOCs (DestinationIP) to detect: CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect Exploited to Run Malicious Files on MSP Technician Accounts Part 1

SOC Prime AI Rules
18 Nov 2026

ScreenConnect Rogue Client Execution via CVE-2026-84869 [Windows Sysmon]

SOC Prime AI Rules
18 Nov 2026

Rogue ScreenConnect Client Execution via PowerShell Start-Process [Windows Powershell]

SOC Prime AI Rules
18 Nov 2026

CVE-2026-84869 ScreenConnect Malicious File Execution [Windows Process Creation]

SOC Prime AI Rules
18 Nov 2026

Simulation Execution

  • Attack Narrative & Commands: An adversary leverages a vulnerability in the ScreenConnect remote access software. By sending a specially crafted request, the attacker forces the ScreenConnect service to execute a shell command. The goal is to establish a foothold on the technician’s workstation. The attacker will first attempt to spawn cmd.exe to explore the environment, followed by powershell.exe to download a secondary stager via curl.exe. This sequence mimics the behavior described in the CVE-2026-84869 exploitation pattern.

  • Regression Test Script:

    # Simulation Script: CVE-2026-84869 Execution Emulation
    # Note: This script simulates the 'ScreenConnect' parent process by creating 
    # a dummy process to ensure the detection logic triggers correctly.
    
    $SimulatedParentPath = "$env:TEMPScreenConnect.exe"
    $DummyContent = @'
    using System;
    using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
    public class Dummy {
        [DllImport("kernel32.dll")]
        public static extern IntPtr CreateProcess(string lpApplicationName, string lpCommandLine, IntPtr lpProcessAttributes, IntPtr lpThreadAttributes, bool bInheritHandles, uint dwCreationFlags, IntPtr lpEnvironment, string lpCurrentDirectory, ref STARTUPINFO lpStartupInfo, out PROCESS_INFORMATION lpProcessInformation);
        public struct STARTUPINFO { public uint cb; public string lpReserved; public string lpDesktop; public string lpTitle; public uint dwX; public uint dwY; public uint dwXSize; public uint dwYSize; public uint dwXCountChars; public uint dwYCountChars; public uint dwFillAttribute; public uint dwFlags; public short wShowWindow; public short cbReserved2; public IntPtr lpReserved2; public IntPtr hStdInput; public IntPtr hStdOutput; public IntPtr hStdError; }
        public struct PROCESS_INFORMATION { public IntPtr hProcess; public IntPtr hThread; public uint dwProcessId; public uint dwThreadId; }
    }
    '@
    
    # 1. Create a dummy executable that mimics ScreenConnect
    $Code = @"
    using System;
    using System.Diagnostics;
    using System.IO;
    
    class Program {
        static void Main() {
            Console.WriteLine("Simulating ScreenConnect Service...");
            // We hold the process open to act as a parent
            System.Threading.Thread.Sleep(60000);
        }
    }
    "@
    $Code | Out-File "$env:TEMPScreenConnectSim.cs"
    Add-Type -TypeDefinition $Code -OutputAssembly "$SimulatedParentPath" -OutputType ConsoleApplication
    
    # 2. Start the simulated ScreenConnect parent process
    Start-Process -FilePath $SimulatedParentPath -WindowStyle Hidden
    
    # Wait for process to initialize
    Start-Sleep -Seconds 2
    
    # 3. Execute the malicious child processes (The actual TTPs)
    Write-Host "[!] Triggering Detection: Spawning cmd.exe from ScreenConnect..."
    Start-Process -FilePath "cmd.exe" -ArgumentList "/c echo Exploited" -WorkingDirectory $env:TEMP
    
    Write-Host "[!] Triggering Detection: Spawning powershell.exe from ScreenConnect..."
    Start-Process -FilePath "powershell.exe" -ArgumentList "-Command Write-Host 'Exploitation Payload Stage 1'" -WorkingDirectory $env:TEMP
    
    Write-Host "[!] Triggering Detection: Spawning curl.exe from ScreenConnect..."
    Start-Process -FilePath "curl.exe" -ArgumentList "-I https://www.google.com" -WorkingDirectory $env:TEMP
    
    Write-Host "[+] Simulation complete. Check your SIEM for alerts."
  • Cleanup Commands:

    # Cleanup Simulation
    Stop-Process -Name "ScreenConnectSim" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    Remove-Item "$env:TEMPScreenConnectSim.cs" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    Remove-Item "$env:TEMPScreenConnect.exe" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue