SOC Prime Bias: High

26 Oct 2026 16:55 UTC

SafePay Ransomware: Tactics, Techniques, and Defensive Measures

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SafePay Ransomware: Tactics, Techniques, and Defensive Measures
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Detection stack

  • AIDR
  • Alert
  • ETL
  • Query

Summary

SafePay ransomware actors target businesses and critical infrastructure through credential theft, phishing, and exploitation of known vulnerabilities. They maintain persistence by manipulating administrative accounts and rely on living-off-the-land techniques for lateral movement. The attack typically ends with data exfiltration followed by hybrid ChaCha20-RSA encryption and cryptocurrency ransom demands.

Investigation

The investigation was conducted jointly by the FBI, USSS, CISA, Germany’s Landeskriminalamt Rheinland-Pfalz, and the UK’s NCA and NWROCU. The findings are based on investigations carried out through August 2026. Since August 2024, SafePay actors have affected at least 600 victims across multiple industries and critical sectors.

Mitigation

Organizations should prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities, particularly those affecting edge devices and firewalls. Applying Zero Trust principles, multifactor authentication (MFA), and strong identity and access management (ICAM) controls is essential. Maintaining immutable offline backups and enforcing network segmentation can also substantially reduce the potential impact of ransomware attacks.

Response

When SafePay activity is detected, organizations should isolate compromised systems and conduct threat hunting to determine the full scope of the intrusion. Incidents should be reported to relevant law enforcement agencies, including the FBI or IC3. After containment, apply eviction strategies to remove the threat and strengthen affected environments to prevent re-entry.

Attack Flow

We are still updating this part.

Detections

Short File Name (via cmdline)

SOC Prime Team
23 Oct 2026

Possible Lateral Movement via WinRM [WSMProvHost] (via process_creation)

SOC Prime Team
23 Oct 2026

Possible Data Exfiltration over Rclone Tool (via cmdline)

SOC Prime Team
23 Oct 2026

Probable Use of Windows Hacktools [Part3] (via cmdline)

SOC Prime Team
23 Oct 2026

Possible Lateral Movement via WinRM [WinRSHost] (via process_creation)

SOC Prime Team
23 Oct 2026

Alternative Remote Access / Management Software (via process_creation)

SOC Prime Team
23 Oct 2026

Possible ShareFinder Usage Attempt (via powershell)

SOC Prime Team
23 Oct 2026

Possible Lateral Movement via PsExec or Similar (via audit)

SOC Prime Team
23 Oct 2026

Possible Netscan Share Enumeration Tool Executing (via audit)

SOC Prime Team
23 Oct 2026

Possible DCSync Attack (via audit)

SOC Prime Team
23 Oct 2026

IOCs (HashSha256) to detect: #StopRansomware: SafePay Ransomware

SOC Prime AI Rules
23 Oct 2026

IOCs (HashSha1) to detect: #StopRansomware: SafePay Ransomware

SOC Prime AI Rules
23 Oct 2026

IOCs (SourceIP) to detect: #StopRansomware: SafePay Ransomware

SOC Prime AI Rules
23 Oct 2026

IOCs (DestinationIP) to detect: #StopRansomware: SafePay Ransomware

SOC Prime AI Rules
23 Oct 2026

Detect SafePay Ransomware Activities [Microsoft Windows Security Event Log]

SOC Prime AI Rules
23 Oct 2026

SafePay Ransomware – Disable Security Software via Registry Modifications [Windows Registry Event]

SOC Prime AI Rules
23 Oct 2026

SafePay Ransomware PowerShell and Command Shell Activity [Windows Powershell]

SOC Prime AI Rules
23 Oct 2026

Simulation Execution

  • Attack Narrative & Commands: The adversary has gained initial access and is performing internal reconnaissance to identify high-value user accounts for lateral movement. Following the SafePay ransomware playbook, the attacker executes a specialized PowerShell script named ShareFinder.ps1 to map network shares and then utilizes the net user command via cmd.exe to enumerate local user accounts. These specific actions are intended to trigger the detection rule to validate if the SOC receives an alert.

  • Regression Test Script:

    # Simulation Script for SafePay Detection Validation
    
    Write-Host "[+] Starting Simulation..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
    
    # 1. Simulate PowerShell 'ShareFinder.ps1' execution
    $scriptPath = Join-Path $env:TEMP "ShareFinder.ps1"
    "Write-Host 'Scanning for shares...'" | Out-File -FilePath $scriptPath -Encoding ascii
    Write-Host "[+] Executing ShareFinder.ps1..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
    Start-Process powershell.exe -ArgumentList "-File `"$scriptPath`"" -WindowStyle Hidden
    
    Start-Sleep -Seconds 2
    
    # 2. Simulate 'net user' via cmd.exe
    Write-Host "[+] Executing 'net user' via cmd.exe..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
    Start-Process cmd.exe -ArgumentList "/c net user" -WindowStyle Hidden
    
    Write-Host "[+] Simulation Commands Dispatched." -ForegroundColor Green
  • Cleanup Commands:

    # Cleanup Simulation Artifacts
    $scriptPath = Join-Path $env:TEMP "ShareFinder.ps1"
    if (Test-Path $scriptPath) {
        Remove-Item $scriptPath -Force
        Write-Host "[+] Cleanup: Removed $scriptPath" -ForegroundColor Green
    } else {
        Write-Host "[!] Cleanup: Script not found, nothing to remove." -ForegroundColor Gray
    }