SafePay Ransomware: Tactics, Techniques, and Defensive Measures
Detection stack
- AIDR
- Alert
- ETL
- Query
Summary
SafePay ransomware actors target businesses and critical infrastructure through credential theft, phishing, and exploitation of known vulnerabilities. They maintain persistence by manipulating administrative accounts and rely on living-off-the-land techniques for lateral movement. The attack typically ends with data exfiltration followed by hybrid ChaCha20-RSA encryption and cryptocurrency ransom demands.
Investigation
The investigation was conducted jointly by the FBI, USSS, CISA, Germany’s Landeskriminalamt Rheinland-Pfalz, and the UK’s NCA and NWROCU. The findings are based on investigations carried out through August 2026. Since August 2024, SafePay actors have affected at least 600 victims across multiple industries and critical sectors.
Mitigation
Organizations should prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities, particularly those affecting edge devices and firewalls. Applying Zero Trust principles, multifactor authentication (MFA), and strong identity and access management (ICAM) controls is essential. Maintaining immutable offline backups and enforcing network segmentation can also substantially reduce the potential impact of ransomware attacks.
Response
When SafePay activity is detected, organizations should isolate compromised systems and conduct threat hunting to determine the full scope of the intrusion. Incidents should be reported to relevant law enforcement agencies, including the FBI or IC3. After containment, apply eviction strategies to remove the threat and strengthen affected environments to prevent re-entry.
Attack Flow
We are still updating this part.
Detections
Short File Name (via cmdline)
Possible Lateral Movement via WinRM [WSMProvHost] (via process_creation)
Possible Data Exfiltration over Rclone Tool (via cmdline)
Probable Use of Windows Hacktools [Part3] (via cmdline)
Possible Lateral Movement via WinRM [WinRSHost] (via process_creation)
Alternative Remote Access / Management Software (via process_creation)
Possible ShareFinder Usage Attempt (via powershell)
Possible Lateral Movement via PsExec or Similar (via audit)
Possible Netscan Share Enumeration Tool Executing (via audit)
Possible DCSync Attack (via audit)
IOCs (HashSha256) to detect: #StopRansomware: SafePay Ransomware
IOCs (HashSha1) to detect: #StopRansomware: SafePay Ransomware
IOCs (SourceIP) to detect: #StopRansomware: SafePay Ransomware
IOCs (DestinationIP) to detect: #StopRansomware: SafePay Ransomware
Detect SafePay Ransomware Activities [Microsoft Windows Security Event Log]
SafePay Ransomware – Disable Security Software via Registry Modifications [Windows Registry Event]
SafePay Ransomware PowerShell and Command Shell Activity [Windows Powershell]
Simulation Execution
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Attack Narrative & Commands: The adversary has gained initial access and is performing internal reconnaissance to identify high-value user accounts for lateral movement. Following the SafePay ransomware playbook, the attacker executes a specialized PowerShell script named
ShareFinder.ps1to map network shares and then utilizes thenet usercommand viacmd.exeto enumerate local user accounts. These specific actions are intended to trigger the detection rule to validate if the SOC receives an alert. -
Regression Test Script:
# Simulation Script for SafePay Detection Validation Write-Host "[+] Starting Simulation..." -ForegroundColor Cyan # 1. Simulate PowerShell 'ShareFinder.ps1' execution $scriptPath = Join-Path $env:TEMP "ShareFinder.ps1" "Write-Host 'Scanning for shares...'" | Out-File -FilePath $scriptPath -Encoding ascii Write-Host "[+] Executing ShareFinder.ps1..." -ForegroundColor Yellow Start-Process powershell.exe -ArgumentList "-File `"$scriptPath`"" -WindowStyle Hidden Start-Sleep -Seconds 2 # 2. Simulate 'net user' via cmd.exe Write-Host "[+] Executing 'net user' via cmd.exe..." -ForegroundColor Yellow Start-Process cmd.exe -ArgumentList "/c net user" -WindowStyle Hidden Write-Host "[+] Simulation Commands Dispatched." -ForegroundColor Green -
Cleanup Commands:
# Cleanup Simulation Artifacts $scriptPath = Join-Path $env:TEMP "ShareFinder.ps1" if (Test-Path $scriptPath) { Remove-Item $scriptPath -Force Write-Host "[+] Cleanup: Removed $scriptPath" -ForegroundColor Green } else { Write-Host "[!] Cleanup: Script not found, nothing to remove." -ForegroundColor Gray }